What transparency can do when incentives fail : an analysis of rent capture /

This paper analyzes the pervasiveness and persistence of rent seeking, misgovernance, and public sector inefficiency in many developing and transition economies. We formalize evidence from country experiences and empirical studies into a stylized analytical framework that reflects realistic constrai...

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Détails bibliographiques
Cote:Libro Electrónico
Auteurs principaux: Dabla-Norris, Era (Auteur), Paul, Elisabeth (Auteur)
Collectivité auteur: International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Department
Format: Électronique eBook
Langue:Inglés
Publié: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia Dept., ©2006.
Collection:IMF working paper ; WP/06/146.
Sujets:
Corruption > Developing countries > Prevention > Econometric models.
Rent (Economic theory) > Econometric models.
Transparency in government > Econometric models.
Rente (Théorie économique) > Modèles économétriques.
Rent (Economic theory) > Econometric models
Developing countries
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