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What transparency can do when incentives fail : an analysis of rent capture /
This paper analyzes the pervasiveness and persistence of rent seeking, misgovernance, and public sector inefficiency in many developing and transition economies. We formalize evidence from country experiences and empirical studies into a stylized analytical framework that reflects realistic constrai...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Autor Corporativo: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia Dept.,
©2006.
|
| Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/146. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Dabla-Norris, Era, |e author. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a What transparency can do when incentives fail : |b an analysis of rent capture / |c prepared by Era Dabla-Norris and Elisabeth Paul. |
| 260 | |a Washington, D.C. : |b International Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia Dept., |c ©2006. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (33 pages) : |b illustrations | ||
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| 490 | 1 | |a IMF working paper ; |v WP/06/146 | |
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references. | ||
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 520 | |a This paper analyzes the pervasiveness and persistence of rent seeking, misgovernance, and public sector inefficiency in many developing and transition economies. We formalize evidence from country experiences and empirical studies into a stylized analytical framework that reflects realistic constraints faced in these countries. Our work departs from the standard economic literature by assuming that (i) the relationship between the government and its population is regulated through an implicit social consensus; (ii) traditional incentives (in the form of public expenditure controls, sanctions, or monetary incentives to perform) are, for various reasons, ineffective in many of these countries; and (iii) the persistence of high corruption reflects a very stable equilibrium, which in turn reflects the fact that several constraints are simultaneously binding. We argue that, when traditional incentives fail, transparency-information provision and disclosure, together with the means to use it-by relaxing different constraints, can contribute to improving public outcomes. | ||
| 506 | |3 Use copy |f Restrictions unspecified |2 star |5 MiAaHDL | ||
| 533 | |a Electronic reproduction. |b [Place of publication not identified] : |c HathiTrust Digital Library, |d 2010. |5 MiAaHDL | ||
| 538 | |a Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. |u http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 |5 MiAaHDL | ||
| 583 | 1 | |a digitized |c 2010 |h HathiTrust Digital Library |l committed to preserve |2 pda |5 MiAaHDL | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. A STYLIZED MODEL -- III. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS -- IV. THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY -- V. CONCLUSIONS -- REFERENCES | |
| 590 | |a ProQuest Ebook Central |b Ebook Central Academic Complete | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Corruption |z Developing countries |x Prevention |x Econometric models. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Rent (Economic theory) |x Econometric models. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Transparency in government |x Econometric models. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Rente (Théorie économique) |x Modèles économétriques. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Rent (Economic theory) |x Econometric models |2 fast | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Developing countries |2 fast | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Paul, Elisabeth, |e author. | |
| 710 | 2 | |a International Monetary Fund. |b Middle East and Central Asia Department. | |
| 758 | |i has work: |a What transparency can do when incentives fail (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCG7V4qFqjJjpKdfmFTCfFX |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Dabla-Norris, Era. |t What transparency can do when incentives fail. |d Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia Dept., ©2006 |w (OCoLC)74908666 |
| 830 | 0 | |a IMF working paper ; |v WP/06/146. | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://ebookcentral.uam.elogim.com/lib/uam-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3014487 |z Texto completo |
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