Consciousness, color, and content /
Experiences and feelings are inherently conscious states. There is something it is like to feel pain, to have an itch, to experience bright red. Philosophers call this sort of consciousness "phenomenal consciousness." Even though phenomenal consciousness seems to be a relatively primitive...
Cote: | Libro Electrónico |
---|---|
Auteur principal: | Tye, Michael |
Format: | Électronique eBook |
Langue: | Inglés |
Publié: |
Cambridge, Mass. :
MIT Press,
2000.
©2000 |
Collection: | Representation and mind.
Bradford book. |
Sujets: | |
Accès en ligne: | Texto completo |
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