Indispensable and Other Myths : Why the CEO Pay Experiment Failed and How to Fix It /

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Prodded by economists in the 1970s, corporate directors began adding stock options and bonuses to the already-generous salaries of CEOs with hopes of boosting their companies' fortunes. Guided by largely unproven assumptions, this trend continues today. So what are companies getting in return f...

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Bibliographic Details
Call Number:Libro Electrónico
Main Author: Dorff, Michael B., 1970-
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:Inglés
Published: Berkeley : University of California Press, ©2014.
Subjects:
Chief executive officers > Salaries, etc.
Executives > Salaries, etc. > United States.
Compensation management > United States.
Chefs de direction > Traitements, indemnités, etc.
Salaires > Gestion > États-Unis.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Industrial Management.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Management.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Management Science.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Organizational Behavior.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Political Economy.
Compensation management
Executives > Salaries, etc.
United States
american business.
american economy.
behavioral theory.
big business.
board members.
bosses.
business.
capitalism.
ceos.
chief executive officer.
compensation.
corporate culture.
corporate directors.
corporate governance tools.
corporate performance.
corporations.
economists.
economy.
era of guaranteed salaries.
executive pay.
human resource professionals.
large salaries.
leadership.
motivation.
performance pay.
project management.
stock options.
Online Access:Texto completo
Description
Summary:Prodded by economists in the 1970s, corporate directors began adding stock options and bonuses to the already-generous salaries of CEOs with hopes of boosting their companies' fortunes. Guided by largely unproven assumptions, this trend continues today. So what are companies getting in return for all the extra money? Not much, according to the empirical data. In Indispensable and Other Myths: Why the CEO Pay Experiment Failed and How to Fix It, Michael Dorff explores the consequences of this development. He shows how performance pay has not demonstrably improved corporate performance and offers studies showing that performance pay cannot improve performance on the kind of tasks companies ask of their CEOs. Moreover, CEOs of large established companies do not typically have much impact on their companies' results. In this eye-opening exposé, Dorff argues that companies should give up on the decades-long experiment to mold compensation into a corporate governance tool and maps out a rationale for returning to the era of guaranteed salaries.
Physical Description:1 online resource
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:9780520958593
0520958594
0520281012
9780520281011

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