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Central bank independence and macroprudential regulation /
We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially op...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Autor Corporativo: | |
| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
©2012.
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| Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/12/101. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
MARC
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| 049 | |a UAMI | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Ueda, Kenichi. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Central bank independence and macroprudential regulation / |c Kenichi Ueda and Fabian Valencia. |
| 260 | |a Washington, D.C. : |b International Monetary Fund, |c ©2012. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (21, 5 pages) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a IMF working paper ; |v WP/12/101 | |
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references. | ||
| 520 | |a We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the. | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Cover; Contents; I: Introduction; II: Model Setup; III: Social Planner Benchmark; IV: Time inconsistency in a dual-mandate central bank; V: Separation of Objectives Achieves Social Optimum; VI: The role of political independence; A: Non-Independent Central Bank and Independent Macro-prudential Regulator; B: Non-Independent Macro-prudential Regulator and Independent Central Bank; VII: Welfare Comparisons; List of Tables; 1 Welfare Loss Across Institutional Arrangements; VIII: Conclusions; References; Appendices; I: Non-Independent Single Authority; II: Distortionary Macro-prudential Regulation. | |
| 590 | |a ProQuest Ebook Central |b Ebook Central Academic Complete | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Banks and banking, Central. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Banks and banking. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Banks of issue. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Banques centrales. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Banks of issue |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Banks and banking |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Banks and banking, Central |2 fast | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Valencia, Fabian. | |
| 710 | 2 | |a International Monetary Fund. | |
| 758 | |i has work: |a Central Bank Independence and Macro-prudential Regulation (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGy93YCR4QtFy3cfdfdd43 |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Valencia, Fabian. |t Central Bank Independence and Macro-prudential Regulation. |d Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2012 |z 9781475502916 |
| 830 | 0 | |a IMF working paper ; |v WP/12/101. | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://ebookcentral.uam.elogim.com/lib/uam-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1606696 |z Texto completo |
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