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Central bank independence and macroprudential regulation /
We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially op...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Autor Corporativo: | |
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| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
©2012.
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| Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/12/101. |
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| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |