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Central bank independence and macroprudential regulation /
We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially op...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Autor Corporativo: | |
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| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
©2012.
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| Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/12/101. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
| Sumario: | We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the. |
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| Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (21, 5 pages) |
| Bibliografía: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: | 9781475581171 1475581173 1475549687 9781475549683 |