Regulatory capture in banking /

Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such "regulatory capture" in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a "captured" regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requi...

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Bibliographic Details
Call Number:Libro Electrónico
Main Author: Hardy, Daniel C. L. (Author)
Corporate Author: International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Financial Systems Department
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:Inglés
Published: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Financial Systems Dept., ©2006.
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/06/34.
Subjects:
Banks and banking > State supervision.
Financial institutions > State supervision.
Banques > Contrôle de l'État.
Institutions financières > Contrôle de l'État.
Banks and banking > State supervision
Financial institutions > State supervision
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