The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction /

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In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hoped that a policy of appeasement would satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial appetite and structured British policy accordingly. This plan was a failure, chiefly because Hitler was not a statesman who would ultimately conform to familiar norms. Chamber...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Payne, Keith B.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Lexington : University Press of Kentucky, 2001.
Colección:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Temas:
Ost-West-Konflikt
Atomstrategie
Abschreckung
Nuclear weapons.
Military policy.
Deterrence (Strategy)
HISTORY > Modern > 20th Century.
TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING > Military Science.
HISTORY > Military > Other.
Dissuasion (Strategie) > Histoire > 20e siecle.
Guerre froide.
Dissuasion (Strategie)
Deterrence (Strategy) > History > 20th century.
Cold War.
Nuclear weapons > United States.
USA
United States.
United States > Military policy.
History.
Electronic book.
Electronic books.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Descripción
Sumario:In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hoped that a policy of appeasement would satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial appetite and structured British policy accordingly. This plan was a failure, chiefly because Hitler was not a statesman who would ultimately conform to familiar norms. Chamberlain's policy was doomed because he had greatly misjudged Hitler's basic beliefs and thus his behavior. U.S. Cold War nuclear deterrence policy was similarly based on the confident but questionable assumption that Soviet leaders would be rational by Washington's standards; they would behave reasonably wh.
Descripción Física:1 online resource (242 pages).
ISBN:9780813148496

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