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Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse /
Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "...
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| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
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Princeton, N.J. :
Princeton University Press,
2002.
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| Colección: | Book collections on Project MUSE.
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| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
| Sumario: | Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies su. |
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| Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (400 pages): illustrations |
| ISBN: | 9781400830138 |