Radicalizing Enactivism : Basic Minds without Content /

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The authors promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition which holds that some kinds of minds - basic minds - are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. It opposes the widely endorsed thesis that cognition al...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Hutto, Daniel D.
Otros Autores: Myin, Erik
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, [2013]
Colección:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Temas:
Philosophy of mind.
Philosophy and cognitive science.
Content (Psychology)
Cognitive science.
Cognition > Philosophy.
Cognition.
PHILOSOPHY > Mind & Body.
cognition.
Contenu (Psychologie)
Sciences cognitives.
Philosophie de l'esprit.
Philosophie et sciences cognitives.
Cognition > Philosophie.
Psychology.
Social Sciences.
Cognitive Science
Cognition
Electronic books.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Descripción
Sumario:The authors promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition which holds that some kinds of minds - basic minds - are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. It opposes the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. The authors defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness.
Descripción Física:1 online resource (240 pages).
ISBN:9780262312172

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