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EBOOKCENTRAL_ocn870244706 |
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OCoLC |
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20240329122006.0 |
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140208s2009 dcu o 000 0 eng d |
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|a EBLCP
|b eng
|e pn
|c EBLCP
|d OCLCQ
|d YDXCP
|d OCLCQ
|d ZCU
|d MERUC
|d ICG
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCF
|d AU@
|d OCLCQ
|d DKC
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCL
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|a 9781452783352
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|a 1452783357
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|a AU@
|b 000053029875
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|a DEBBG
|b BV044178237
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|a DKDLA
|b 820010-katalog:ssib005149437
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|a (OCoLC)870244706
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|a HG1581
|b .C54 2009
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|a 338.23178
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|a UAMI
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|a Maechler, Andrea M.
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|a Who Disciplines Bank Managers?
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|a Washington :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2009.
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|a 1 online resource (76 pages)
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|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
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|a online resource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
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|a IMF Working Papers ;
|v v. Working Paper No. 09/272
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|a Print version record.
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|a Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Related Literature and Hypothesis; III. Methodology and Data; A. Methodology; B. Variable Selection; C. Dataset; 1. Histogram of Total Assets; 1. Descriptive Statistics, Differences of Means and Medians, and Correlations; IV. Bank Performance Prior to Executive Turnover; 2. Percentage Changes in Bank Performance Prior to Executive Turnover; V. Multivariate Analysis; 3. Conditional Logit Models for Different Sources of Discipine; 4. Key Variables of Interest by Percentile of Z-Score.
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|a 5. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Treatment Group)6. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Treatment and Control Group); 7. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Matching on Propensity Scores, Treatment, and Control Group; VI. Conclusions; I. Measuring Bank Soundness Using the Z-Score; II. Overview of Data and Sources; III. Turnovers in Small and Medium Sized U.S. Banks 1990-2007; IV. Robustness Checks; References; Footnotes.
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|a We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a 'laboratory setting' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders' ability to fire an executive. Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter.
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590 |
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|a ProQuest Ebook Central
|b Ebook Central Academic Complete
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650 |
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|a Banks and banking.
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650 |
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|a Corporate governance.
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650 |
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|a Gouvernement d'entreprise.
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650 |
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|a Banks and banking
|2 fast
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650 |
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|a Corporate governance
|2 fast
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700 |
1 |
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|a Schaeck, Klaus.
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700 |
1 |
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|a Cihák, Martin.
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700 |
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|a Stolz, Stéphanie Marie.
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758 |
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|i has work:
|a Who disciplines bank managers? (Text)
|1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCH6PbqGmpkpCtmJBgBpWwC
|4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork
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776 |
0 |
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|i Print version:
|a Maechler, Andrea M.
|t Who Disciplines Bank Managers?
|d Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2009
|z 9781451874174
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830 |
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0 |
|a IMF Working Papers.
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856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://ebookcentral.uam.elogim.com/lib/uam-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1606008
|z Texto completo
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938 |
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|a EBL - Ebook Library
|b EBLB
|n EBL1606008
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938 |
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|a YBP Library Services
|b YANK
|n 11618286
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938 |
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|a YBP Library Services
|b YANK
|n 12385297
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994 |
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|a 92
|b IZTAP
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