Political price cycles in regulated industries : theory and evidence /

This paper develops a model of political regulation in which politicians set the regulated price in order to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model, yielding an equilibrium in which the real price...

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Bibliographic Details
Call Number:Libro Electrónico
Main Authors: Paiva, Claudio (Author), Moita, Rodrigo (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:Inglés
Published: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, 2006.
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/06/260.
Subjects:
Prices > Government policy.
Price regulation.
Prix > Politique gouvernementale.
Price regulation
Prices > Government policy
Online Access:Texto completo
Table of Contents:
  • Contents
  • I. INTRODUCTION
  • II. BACKGROUND
  • III. A MODEL OF A POLITICAL PRICE CYCLES IN A REGULATED INDUSTRY
  • IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
  • V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
  • Appendix 1. List of Countries Included in the Empirical Work
  • REFERENCES

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