Political price cycles in regulated industries : theory and evidence /

This paper develops a model of political regulation in which politicians set the regulated price in order to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model, yielding an equilibrium in which the real price...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autores principales: Paiva, Claudio (Autor), Moita, Rodrigo (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, 2006.
Colección:IMF working paper ; WP/06/260.
Temas:
Prices > Government policy.
Price regulation.
Prix > Politique gouvernementale.
Price regulation
Prices > Government policy
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Contents
  • I. INTRODUCTION
  • II. BACKGROUND
  • III. A MODEL OF A POLITICAL PRICE CYCLES IN A REGULATED INDUSTRY
  • IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
  • V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
  • Appendix 1. List of Countries Included in the Empirical Work
  • REFERENCES

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