Political price cycles in regulated industries : theory and evidence /
This paper develops a model of political regulation in which politicians set the regulated price in order to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model, yielding an equilibrium in which the real price...
Call Number: | Libro Electrónico |
---|---|
Main Authors: | , |
Format: | Electronic eBook |
Language: | Inglés |
Published: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute,
2006.
|
Series: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/260. |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Texto completo |
Table of Contents:
- Contents
- I. INTRODUCTION
- II. BACKGROUND
- III. A MODEL OF A POLITICAL PRICE CYCLES IN A REGULATED INDUSTRY
- IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
- V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
- Appendix 1. List of Countries Included in the Empirical Work
- REFERENCES