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Political price cycles in regulated industries : theory and evidence /
This paper develops a model of political regulation in which politicians set the regulated price in order to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model, yielding an equilibrium in which the real price...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute,
2006.
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| Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/260. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |