Regulatory capture in banking /
Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such "regulatory capture" in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a "captured" regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requi...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autor principal: | |
Autor Corporativo: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Financial Systems Dept.,
©2006.
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Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/34. |
Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Sumario: | Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such "regulatory capture" in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a "captured" regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requirements to reduce negative spillovers of risk-taking by weaker banks. In these circumstances, differences in the regulatory regime across jurisdictions may persist because each adapts its regulations to suit its dominant incumbent institutions |
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Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (23 pages) : illustrations |
Bibliografía: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 22-23). |
ISBN: | 1283516659 9781283516655 9781451908305 145190830X |