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Regulatory capture in banking /

Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such "regulatory capture" in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a "captured" regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requi...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Hardy, Daniel C. L. (Autor)
Autor Corporativo: International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Financial Systems Department
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Financial Systems Dept., ©2006.
Colección:IMF working paper ; WP/06/34.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Descripción
Sumario:Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such "regulatory capture" in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a "captured" regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requirements to reduce negative spillovers of risk-taking by weaker banks. In these circumstances, differences in the regulatory regime across jurisdictions may persist because each adapts its regulations to suit its dominant incumbent institutions
Descripción Física:1 online resource (23 pages) : illustrations
Bibliografía:Includes bibliographical references (pages 22-23).
ISBN:1283516659
9781283516655
9781451908305
145190830X