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Regulatory capture in banking /

Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such "regulatory capture" in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a "captured" regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requi...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Hardy, Daniel C. L. (Autor)
Autor Corporativo: International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Financial Systems Department
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Financial Systems Dept., ©2006.
Colección:IMF working paper ; WP/06/34.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo