Strategic interactions between an independent central bank and a myopic government with government debt /

We analyse optimal discretionary games between a benevolent central bank and a myopic government in a New Keynesian model. First, when lump-sum taxes are available and public debt is absent, we show that a Nash game results in too much government spending and excessively high interest rates, while f...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autores principales: Stehn, Sven Jari (Autor), Vines, David (Autor)
Autor Corporativo: International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: [Washington, D.C.?] : International Monetary Fund, ©2009.
©2008
Colección:IMF working paper ; WP/08/164.
Temas:
Expenditures, Public > Econometric models.
Fiscal policy > Econometric models.
Banks and banking, Central > Econometric models.
Debts, Public > Econometric models.
Monetary policy > Econometric models.
Dépenses publiques > Modèles économétriques.
Politique fiscale > Modèles économétriques.
Banques centrales > Modèles économétriques.
Dettes publiques > Modèles économétriques.
Politique monétaire > Modèles économétriques.
Banks and banking, Central > Econometric models
Debts, Public > Econometric models
Expenditures, Public > Econometric models
Fiscal policy > Econometric models
Monetary policy > Econometric models
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • I. Introduction; II. The Model; A. Consumers; B. Price Setting; C. Aggregate Demand and Fiscal Policy; D. The System; E. Social Welfare; F. Policy Objectives; G. Calibration; III. Solving for Optimal Policy; A. Cooperative Policy; B. Non-Cooperative Policy under Discretion; IV. Optimal Policy when Lump-Sum Taxes are Available; A. Cooperative Policy; 1. Commitment; 2. Discretion; B. Non-Cooperative Policy with a Myopic Fiscal Authority; 1. Nash; 2. Fiscal Leadership; 3. Robustness; V. Optimal Policy when Lump-Sum Taxes are not Available; A. Cooperative Policy; 1. Commitment.
  • 2. DiscretionB. Non-Cooperative Policy with a Myopic Fiscal Authority; 1. Nash; 2. Fiscal Leadership; C. Robustness; VI. Optimal Institutions; A.A Debt Penalty; B.A Conservative Central Bank; VII. Conclusion; Appendix; A. Social Welfare; B. Policy Myopia; C. Solving the Model; 1. Optimal Cooperative Policy ; 2. Optimal Non-Cooperative Policy under Discretion; References; Tables; 1. Optimal policy simulations for a transitory cost-push shock; Figures; 1. Dynamic responses to a transitory cost-push shock under optimal policy.

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