Strategic interactions between an independent central bank and a myopic government with government debt /

We analyse optimal discretionary games between a benevolent central bank and a myopic government in a New Keynesian model. First, when lump-sum taxes are available and public debt is absent, we show that a Nash game results in too much government spending and excessively high interest rates, while f...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autores principales: Stehn, Sven Jari (Autor), Vines, David (Autor)
Autor Corporativo: International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: [Washington, D.C.?] : International Monetary Fund, ©2009.
©2008
Colección:IMF working paper ; WP/08/164.
Temas:
Expenditures, Public > Econometric models.
Fiscal policy > Econometric models.
Banks and banking, Central > Econometric models.
Debts, Public > Econometric models.
Monetary policy > Econometric models.
Dépenses publiques > Modèles économétriques.
Politique fiscale > Modèles économétriques.
Banques centrales > Modèles économétriques.
Dettes publiques > Modèles économétriques.
Politique monétaire > Modèles économétriques.
Banks and banking, Central > Econometric models
Debts, Public > Econometric models
Expenditures, Public > Econometric models
Fiscal policy > Econometric models
Monetary policy > Econometric models
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