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Strategic interactions between an independent central bank and a myopic government with government debt /
We analyse optimal discretionary games between a benevolent central bank and a myopic government in a New Keynesian model. First, when lump-sum taxes are available and public debt is absent, we show that a Nash game results in too much government spending and excessively high interest rates, while f...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Autor Corporativo: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
[Washington, D.C.?] :
International Monetary Fund,
©2009.
©2008 |
| Colección: | IMF working paper ;
WP/08/164. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Stehn, Sven Jari, |e author. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Strategic interactions between an independent central bank and a myopic government with government debt / |c prepared by Sven Jari Stehn and David Vines. |
| 260 | |a [Washington, D.C.?] : |b International Monetary Fund, |c ©2009. | ||
| 264 | 4 | |c ©2008 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (38 pages) : |b illustrations | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a IMF working paper ; |v WP/08/164 | |
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 36-38). | ||
| 520 | 3 | |a We analyse optimal discretionary games between a benevolent central bank and a myopic government in a New Keynesian model. First, when lump-sum taxes are available and public debt is absent, we show that a Nash game results in too much government spending and excessively high interest rates, while fiscal leadership reinstates the cooperative outcome under discretion. Second, we show that this familiar result breaks down when lump-sum taxes are unavailable. With government debt, the Nash equilibrium still entails too much public spending but leads to lower interest rates than the cooperative policy, because debt has to be adjusted back to its pre-shock level to ensure time consistency. A setup of fiscal leadership does not avoid this socially costly outcome. Imposing a debt penalty onto the myopic government under either Nash or fiscal leadership raises welfare substantially, while appointing a conservative central bank is less effective. | |
| 505 | 0 | |a I. Introduction; II. The Model; A. Consumers; B. Price Setting; C. Aggregate Demand and Fiscal Policy; D. The System; E. Social Welfare; F. Policy Objectives; G. Calibration; III. Solving for Optimal Policy; A. Cooperative Policy; B. Non-Cooperative Policy under Discretion; IV. Optimal Policy when Lump-Sum Taxes are Available; A. Cooperative Policy; 1. Commitment; 2. Discretion; B. Non-Cooperative Policy with a Myopic Fiscal Authority; 1. Nash; 2. Fiscal Leadership; 3. Robustness; V. Optimal Policy when Lump-Sum Taxes are not Available; A. Cooperative Policy; 1. Commitment. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 2. DiscretionB. Non-Cooperative Policy with a Myopic Fiscal Authority; 1. Nash; 2. Fiscal Leadership; C. Robustness; VI. Optimal Institutions; A.A Debt Penalty; B.A Conservative Central Bank; VII. Conclusion; Appendix; A. Social Welfare; B. Policy Myopia; C. Solving the Model; 1. Optimal Cooperative Policy ; 2. Optimal Non-Cooperative Policy under Discretion; References; Tables; 1. Optimal policy simulations for a transitory cost-push shock; Figures; 1. Dynamic responses to a transitory cost-push shock under optimal policy. | |
| 590 | |a ProQuest Ebook Central |b Ebook Central Academic Complete | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Expenditures, Public |x Econometric models. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Fiscal policy |x Econometric models. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Banks and banking, Central |x Econometric models. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Debts, Public |x Econometric models. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Monetary policy |x Econometric models. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Dépenses publiques |x Modèles économétriques. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Politique fiscale |x Modèles économétriques. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Banques centrales |x Modèles économétriques. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Dettes publiques |x Modèles économétriques. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Politique monétaire |x Modèles économétriques. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Banks and banking, Central |x Econometric models |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Debts, Public |x Econometric models |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Expenditures, Public |x Econometric models |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Fiscal policy |x Econometric models |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Monetary policy |x Econometric models |2 fast | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Vines, David, |e author. | |
| 710 | 2 | |a International Monetary Fund. |b Fiscal Affairs Department. | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Stehn, Sven Jari. |t Strategic interactions between an independent central bank and a myopic government with government debt. |d Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dept., 2008 |w (OCoLC)250756955 |
| 830 | 0 | |a IMF working paper ; |v WP/08/164. | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://ebookcentral.uam.elogim.com/lib/uam-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1605826 |z Texto completo |
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