Migration and Democracy : How Remittances Undermine Dictatorships

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Escribà-Folch, Abel
Other Authors: Meseguer, Covadonga, Wright, Joseph
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:Inglés
Published: Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2022.
Series:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Subjects:
Electronic books.
Online Access:Texto completo
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Contents
  • List of Illustrations and Tables
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgements
  • 1. Introduction
  • 1.1. Globalization, Migration, and Political Change
  • 1.1.1. Existing Theories: Migration and Democracy
  • 1.1.2. Foreign Income Inflows and Autocratic Rule
  • 1.1.3. Remittances in the Global South
  • 1.2. Previewing the Argument
  • 1.3. Plan of the Book
  • 2. Migration and Repertoires of Contention: How Remittances Undermine Dictatorship
  • 2.1. Citizens as Agents of Change
  • 2.2. Global Forces and Democratization
  • 2.2.1. How International Forces Shape Authoritarian Survival
  • 2.2.2. Remittances as a Global Force for Bottom-Up Democratization
  • 2.3. Remittances and Democratization: What Comes after Exit?
  • 2.3.1. Remittances Sustain Dictatorship: Repression, Patronage, and Grievance
  • 2.3.2. How Exit Funds Voice and Weakens Loyalty
  • 2.4. Refining the Theoretical Mechanisms: Political Preferences and Poverty
  • 2.4.1. Protest
  • 2.4.2. Voting
  • 2.4.3. Political Context and Political Behavior
  • 2.5. Conclusion
  • 3. Remittances, Revenue, and Government Spending in Dictatorships
  • 3.1. Remittances, State Resources, and Authoritarian Stability
  • 3.1.1. The Revenue Effect
  • 3.1.2. The Substitution Effect
  • 3.1.3. Taxation and the Demand for Democracy
  • 3.2. Do Remittances Increase Government Revenue in Dictatorships?
  • 3.3. Remittances and Government Spending
  • 3.3.1. Government Health Spending and Military Spending
  • 3.3.2. Do Remittances Boost Petrol Subsidies?
  • 3.4. Remittances and Repression
  • 3.4.1. Do Remittances Enhance Violent Repression in Dictatorships?
  • 3.4.2. Do Remittances Harm Civil Liberties and Political Rights?
  • 3.5. Conclusion
  • 4. Remittances Fund Opponents
  • 4.1. Remitted Income and the Global Rise in Protest
  • 4.1.1. Anti-Government Protest
  • 4.1.2. Pro-Government Mobilization
  • 4.2. How Remittances Boost Protests
  • 4.2.1. Capturing Political Preferences: Opposition and Regime Strongholds
  • 4.2.2. Testing the Micro-Logic Linking Remittances to Protest
  • 4.2.3. Remittances, Poverty, and Protest
  • 4.3. Conclusion
  • 4.4. Appendix: Measuring Pro-Government Areas
  • 4.4.1. Vote Choice and Non-Response
  • 4.4.2. External Validity
  • 5. Remittances Demobilize Supporters
  • 5.1. Remittances and the Electoral Fate of Ruling Parties
  • 5.1.1. Ruling Party Vote Share
  • 5.1.2. The Turnout Contest
  • 5.2. How Remittances Cut Clientelistic Ties to the Ruling Party
  • 5.2.1. Testing the Micro-Logic of Remittances and Turnout
  • 5.2.2. Remittances, Poverty, and Turnout
  • 5.2.3. Remittances, Political Preferences, and Turnout in Swing Districts
  • 5.2.4. An AlternativeMeasure of Government Support
  • 5.3. Conclusion
  • 6. Remittances and Democratization
  • 6.1. Closing the Resource Gap
  • 6.2. Remittances, Voting, and Protests in Senegal and Cambodia
  • 6.2.1. Senegal
  • 6.2.2. Cambodia
  • 6.2.3. Conclusion

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