Military Realism : The Logic and Limits of Force and Innovation in the U.S. Army /

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"After the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army considered counterinsurgency (COIN) a mistake to be avoided. Many found it surprising, then, when setbacks in recent conflicts led the same army to adopt a COIN doctrine. Scholarly debates have primarily employed existing theories of military bureaucracy or...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Campbell, Peter P. (Auteur)
Format: Électronique eBook
Langue:Inglés
Publié: Columbia, Missouri : University of Missouri Press, [2019]
Collection:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Sujets:
Military policy.
Military doctrine.
TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING > Military Science.
HISTORY > Military > Other.
HISTORY > Military > United States.
HISTORY > Military > Strategy.
Doctrines militaires > États-Unis > Histoire > 21e siecle.
Doctrines militaires > États-Unis > Histoire > 20e siecle.
Military doctrine > United States > History > 21st century.
Military doctrine > United States > History > 20th century.
United States.
United States > Military policy.
History.
Electronic books.
Accès en ligne:Texto completo

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