The Tet Offensive : Intelligence Failure in War /

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"In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in American history, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing on Vietcong and recently...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Wirtz, James J., 1958-
Format: Électronique eBook
Langue:Inglés
Publié: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1991.
Collection:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Sujets:
Tet-offensief.
Military intelligence.
HISTORY > Military > Vietnam War.
HISTORY > Asia > Southeast Asia.
Guerre du Viêt-nam, 1961-1975 > Service des renseignements militaires.
Têt, Offensive du, 1968.
Vietnam War, 1961-1975 > United States.
Vietnam War, 1961-1975 > Military intelligence.
Tet Offensive, 1968.
United States.
Electronic books.
Accès en ligne:Texto completo
Table des matières:
  • PART 1. "THE BIG VICTORY, THE GREAT TASK": 1. The Communist debate over strategy ; 2. Plans, preparations, and objectives of the Tet Offensive
  • PART 2. THE ORIGINS OF SURPRISE: 3. The sources of American biases ; 4. Missing the signals: July-November 1967 ; 5. Missing the signals: December 1967-30 January 1968 ; 6. Reacting to the Tet Offensive
  • Conclusion: Explaining the failure of intelligence.

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