Cheap Threats : Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak States /

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The United States has a huge advantage in military power over other states, yet it is frequently unable to coerce weak adversary states with threats alone. Instead, over the past two decades, the leaders of Iraq, Haiti, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Libya have dismissed US threats and invited military cl...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Pfundstein Chamberlain, Dianne (Auteur)
Format: Électronique eBook
Langue:Inglés
Publié: Washington, D.C. : Georgetown University Press, [2016]
Collection:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Sujets:
Strategy.
Military relations.
Military policy.
Military art and science > Decision making.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Security (National & International)
Strategie.
Art et science militaires > Prise de decision.
United States.
Developing countries.
Developing countries > Military relations > United States.
United States > Military relations > Developing countries.
United States > Military policy.
Electronic books.
Accès en ligne:Texto completo
Table des matières:
  • Introduction : too cheap to compel
  • The logic of costly compellence
  • U.S. compellent threats 1945-2007
  • The 1962 Cuban missile crisis
  • The 2011 Libya crisis
  • The 1991 threat against Iraq
  • The 2003 threat against Iraq
  • Conclusion : the implications of costly compellence for theory and policy
  • Appendix. Description of how the dataset was constructed.

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