Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control

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If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod-...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Weber, Steve, 1961-
Format: Électronique eBook
Langue:Inglés
Publié: Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2014.
Collection:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Sujets:
Strategic forces.
Nuclear arms control.
Game theory.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Government > International.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > International Relations > General.
Theorie des jeux.
Forces strategiques > URSS.
Forces strategiques > États-Unis.
Armes nucleaires > Contrôle > URSS.
Armes nucleaires > Contrôle > États-Unis.
Game Theory
Strategic forces > Soviet Union.
Strategic forces > United States.
Nuclear arms control > Soviet Union.
Nuclear arms control > United States.
United States.
Soviet Union.
Electronic books.
Accès en ligne:Texto completo

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