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100402s2008 nju o 00 0 eng d |
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|a 9781400835591
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|z 9780691133201
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|z 9780691133218
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|a (OCoLC)593342182
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|a MdBmJHUP
|c MdBmJHUP
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1 |
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|a Brams, Steven J.
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|a Mathematics and Democracy :
|b Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures /
|c Steven J. Brams.
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| 264 |
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|a Princeton, N.J. :
|b Princeton University Press,
|c 2008.
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| 264 |
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|a Baltimore, Md. :
|b Project MUSE,
|c 2015
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| 264 |
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|c ©2008.
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| 300 |
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|a 1 online resource (390 pages).
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|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
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|a online resource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
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|a Electing a single winner : approval voting in practice -- Electing a single winner : approval voting in theory -- Electing a single winner : combining approval and preference -- Electing multiple winners : constrained approval voting -- Electing multiple winners : the minimax procedure -- Electing multiple winners : minimizing misrepresentation -- Selecting winners in multiple elections -- Selecting a governing coalition in a parliament -- Allocating cabinet ministries in a parliament -- Allocating indivisible goods : help the worst-off or avoid envy? -- Allocating a single homogeneous divisible good : divide-the-dollar -- Allocating multiple homogeneous divisible goods : adjusted winner -- Allocating a single heterogeneous good : cutting a cake -- Allocating divisible and indivisible goods -- Summary and conclusions.
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|a Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods.
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| 546 |
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|a English.
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| 588 |
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|a Description based on print version record.
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| 650 |
1 |
7 |
|a Wiskundige modellen.
|2 gtt
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| 650 |
1 |
7 |
|a Procedures.
|2 gtt
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| 650 |
1 |
7 |
|a Kiesstelsels.
|2 gtt
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| 650 |
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7 |
|a Voting
|x Mathematical models.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst01169244
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Finance, Public
|x Mathematical models.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst00924563
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Elections
|x Mathematical models.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst00904354
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| 650 |
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7 |
|a MATHEMATICS
|x Applied.
|2 bisacsh
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| 650 |
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7 |
|a POLITICAL SCIENCE
|x Political Process
|x Elections.
|2 bisacsh
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| 650 |
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6 |
|a Finances publiques
|x Modeles mathematiques.
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| 650 |
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6 |
|a Élections
|x Modeles mathematiques.
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| 650 |
|
6 |
|a Vote
|x Modeles mathematiques.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Finance, Public
|x Mathematical models.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Elections
|x Mathematical models.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Voting
|x Mathematical models.
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| 655 |
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7 |
|a Electronic books.
|2 local
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| 710 |
2 |
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|a Project Muse.
|e distributor
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| 830 |
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|a Book collections on Project MUSE.
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|z Texto completo
|u https://projectmuse.uam.elogim.com/book/31098/
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| 945 |
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|a Project MUSE - Custom Collection
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| 945 |
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|a Project MUSE - Archive Complete Supplement III
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| 945 |
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|a Project MUSE - Archive Political Science and Policy Studies Supplement III
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