Reputation and International Cooperation : Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries

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How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He expl...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Tomz, Michael
Format: Électronique eBook
Langue:Inglés
Publié: Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2011.
Collection:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Sujets:
Debts, External.
Debtor and creditor.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Political Economy.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Public Finance.
Debiteur et creancier > Histoire.
Dettes exterieures > Histoire.
Debtor and creditor > History.
Debts, External > History.
History.
Electronic books.
Accès en ligne:Texto completo
Table des matières:
  • Cover; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; List of Tables; List of Figures; Preface; Part One: Theory; Chapter 1. The Puzzle of Cooperation in International Debt; Chapter 2. A Theory of Cooperation through Reputation; Part Two: Evidence; Chapter 3. Reputations of New and Seasoned Borrowers; Chapter 4. Reputation in Expert Opinion; Chapter 5. Reputations During Good Times and Bad; Chapter 6. Enforcement by Gunboats; Chapter 7. Enforcement through Trade Sanctions; Chapter 8. Enforcement through Collective Retaliation; Part Three: Implications.
  • Chapter 9. Reputation and Cooperation Under AnarchyBibliography; Index.

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