The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box : Electoral Manipulation, Economic Maneuvering, and Political Order in Autocracies /

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Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in au...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Higashijima, Masaaki (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:Inglés
Published: Ann Arbor, Michigan : University of Michigan Press, [2022]
Series:Book collections on Project MUSE.
Subjects:
Elections > Corrupt practices.
Dictatorship.
Dictature > Kazakhstan.
Dictature > Études de cas.
Corruption electorale > Kazakhstan.
Corruption electorale > Études de cas.
Dictatorship > Kyrgyzstan.
Dictatorship > Kazakhstan.
Dictatorship > Case studies.
Elections > Corrupt practices > Kyrgyzstan.
Elections > Corrupt practices > Kazakhstan.
Elections > Corrupt practices > Case studies.
Kyrgyzstan.
Kazakhstan.
Case studies.
Electronic books.
Online Access:Texto completo
Table of Contents:
  • Part I. Puzzles and arguments
  • Chapter 1. Introduction
  • Chapter 2. A theory of autocratic elections
  • Part II. Cross-national explorations
  • Chapter 3. Blatant electoral fraud
  • Chapter 4. Institutional manipulation
  • Chapter 5. Economic maneuvering
  • Chapter 6. Backfiring at the Ballot Box
  • Part III. Comparative case studies
  • Chapter 7. From electoral manipulation to economic maneuvering: Nazarbaev's Kazakhstan
  • Chapter 8. From electoral manipulation to autocratic breakdown: Akaev's Kyrgyzstan
  • Chapter 9. Conclusion.

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