The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box : electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies /

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Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in au...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Higashijima, Masaaki (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Ann Arbor, Michigan : University of Michigan Press, [2022]
Colección:Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies series.
Temas:
Elections > Corrupt practices > Case studies.
Elections > Corrupt practices > Kazakhstan.
Elections > Corrupt practices > Kyrgyzstan.
Dictatorship > Case studies.
Dictatorship > Kazakhstan.
Dictatorship > Kyrgyzstan.
Corruption électorale > Études de cas.
Corruption électorale > Kazakhstan.
Dictature > Études de cas.
Dictature > Kazakhstan.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > General.
Dictatorship.
Elections > Corrupt practices.
Kazakhstan.
Kyrgyzstan.
Electronic books.
Case studies.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Part I. Puzzles and arguments
  • Chapter 1. Introduction
  • Chapter 2. A theory of autocratic elections
  • Part II. Cross-national explorations
  • Chapter 3. Blatant electoral fraud
  • Chapter 4. Institutional manipulation
  • Chapter 5. Economic maneuvering
  • Chapter 6. Backfiring at the Ballot Box
  • Part III. Comparative case studies
  • Chapter 7. From electoral manipulation to economic maneuvering: Nazarbaev's Kazakhstan
  • Chapter 8. From electoral manipulation to autocratic breakdown: Akaev's Kyrgyzstan
  • Chapter 9. Conclusion.

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