Cargando…
Individual strategy and social structure : an evolutionary theory of institutions /
Publisher description: Neoclassical economics assumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of t...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Princeton, N.J. :
Princeton University Press,
c1998.
|
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
MARC
| LEADER | 00000cam a2200000 a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | JSTOR_on1159003361 | ||
| 003 | OCoLC | ||
| 005 | 20231005004200.0 | ||
| 006 | m o d | ||
| 007 | cr ||||||||||| | ||
| 008 | 970911s1998 njua ob 001 0 eng | ||
| 010 | |a 2021698793 | ||
| 040 | |a DLC |b eng |e pn |c DLC |d N$T |d UX1 |d INARC |d JSTOR |d OCLCO |d OCLCQ |d OCLCO | ||
| 015 | |a GB9929640 |2 bnb | ||
| 016 | 7 | |a 006408993 |2 Uk | |
| 019 | |a 1159002694 |a 1175640418 |a 1193948981 | ||
| 020 | |a 9780691214252 |q ebook | ||
| 020 | |a 0691214255 | ||
| 020 | |z 069102684X (cloth : alk. paper) | ||
| 020 | |z 9780691026848 | ||
| 020 | |z 0691086877 | ||
| 020 | |z 9780691086873 | ||
| 029 | 1 | |a AU@ |b 000067494065 | |
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1159003361 |z (OCoLC)1159002694 |z (OCoLC)1175640418 |z (OCoLC)1193948981 | ||
| 037 | |a 22573/ctv10gcdpf |b JSTOR | ||
| 050 | 0 | 0 | |a HM131 |
| 072 | 7 | |a BUS |x 023000 |2 bisacsh | |
| 080 | |a 330.116 | ||
| 082 | 0 | 0 | |a 306 |2 21 |
| 084 | |a 83.15 |2 bcl | ||
| 049 | |a UAMI | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Young, H. Peyton, |d 1945- | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Individual strategy and social structure : |b an evolutionary theory of institutions / |c H. Peyton Young. |
| 260 | |a Princeton, N.J. : |b Princeton University Press, |c c1998. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (xiii, 189 p.) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (p. [177]-184) and index. | ||
| 588 | |a Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed. | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Ch. 1. Overview -- Ch. 2. Learning -- Ch. 3. Dynamic and Stochastic Stability -- Ch. 4. Adaptive Learning in Small Games -- Ch. 5. Variations on the Learning Process -- Ch. 6. Local Interaction -- Ch. 7. Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Selection in General Games -- Ch. 8. Bargaining -- Ch. 9. Contracts -- Ch. 10. Conclusion -- Appendix. Proofs of Selected Theorems. | |
| 520 | |a Publisher description: Neoclassical economics assumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions. | ||
| 590 | |a JSTOR |b Books at JSTOR Demand Driven Acquisitions (DDA) | ||
| 590 | |a JSTOR |b Books at JSTOR All Purchased | ||
| 590 | |a JSTOR |b Books at JSTOR Evidence Based Acquisitions | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Social institutions. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Institutional economics. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Evolutionary economics. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Game theory. | |
| 650 | 2 | |a Game Theory | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Institutions sociales. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Institutionnalisme. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Théorie de l'évolution économique. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Théorie des jeux. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a social institutions. |2 aat | |
| 650 | 7 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS |x Economic History. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Evolutionary economics |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Game theory |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Institutional economics |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Social institutions |2 fast | |
| 650 | 1 | 7 | |a Institutionele economie. |2 gtt |
| 650 | 1 | 7 | |a Speltheorie. |2 gtt |
| 650 | 1 | 7 | |a Instituties. |2 gtt |
| 650 | 7 | |a Économie évolutionniste. |2 ram | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Institutions sociales. |2 ram | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Institutionnalisme. |2 ram | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Théorie des jeux. |2 ram | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |t Individual strategy and social structure |d Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c1998. |z 069102684X (cloth : alk. paper) |w (DLC) 97041419 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://jstor.uam.elogim.com/stable/10.2307/j.ctv10h9d35 |z Texto completo |
| 938 | |a Internet Archive |b INAR |n individualstrate0000youn | ||
| 938 | |a EBSCOhost |b EBSC |n 2444812 | ||
| 994 | |a 92 |b IZTAP | ||