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Political economy in macroeconomics /

Allan Drazen focuses on the implications of political and economic outcomes rather than polictical and public choice per se limiting his coverage to macroeconomics.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Drazen, Allan
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2002, ©2000.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

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100 1 |a Drazen, Allan. 
245 1 0 |a Political economy in macroeconomics /  |c Allan Drazen. 
264 1 |a Princeton, N.J. :  |b Princeton University Press,  |c 2002, ©2000. 
300 |a 1 online resource (xiv, 775 pages) :  |b illustrations 
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504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 735-763) and indexes. 
520 |a Allan Drazen focuses on the implications of political and economic outcomes rather than polictical and public choice per se limiting his coverage to macroeconomics. 
505 0 0 |g Part I:  |t Basic issues and tools of analysis.  |g 1.  |t What is a political economy?  |t Politics and economics --  |t Types of heterogeneity --  |t An illustration of approaches --  |t Plan of the book --  |g 2.  |t Economic models for political analysis.  |t The principal-agent problem --  |t Discrete time dynamic models -- dynamic programming --  |t The overlapping generations model --  |t Effects of uncertain future policies --  |g 3.  |t Decisionmaking mechanisms.  |t How much political detail? --  |t Choosing decisionmaking mechanisms --  |t Direct democracy --  |t Representative democracy --  |t Multiparty systems --  |t Interest groups and lobbying --  |t Transaction cost politics --  |g Part II:  |t Commitment, credibility, and reputation.  |g 4.  |t The time-consistency problem.  |t Capital taxation --  |t Time inconsistency as a conflict of interests --  |t The Barro-Gordon model --  |t Seigniorage revenue and the optimum quantity of money --  |t Commitment versus flexibility --  |g 5.  |t Laws, institutions, and delegated authority.  |t Laws, constitutions, and social contracts --  |t Delegation of authority --  |t Central bank independence --  |t Fiscal structures for time consistency --  |g 6.  |t Credibility and reputation.  |t Reputation --  |t "Reputation" under complete information --  |t Reputation under incomplete information -- mimicking --  |t Does reputation "solve" the time-consistency problem? Three caveats --  |t Signaling --  |t Reputation for not reneging on commitments --  |t Credibility and external circumstances --  |t Ambiguity, secrecy, and imprecise control --  |g Part III:  |t Heterogeneity and conflicting interests --  |g 7.  |t Elections and changes of policymakers.  |t Elections and policymaker performance --  |t The opportunistic political business cycle --  |t Partisan political cycles --  |t Competence and prospective voting --  |t Campaign promises --  |t Interactions of the executive and the legislature --  |t Multiparty systems and endogenous election dates --  |t Tying the hands of one's replacement --  |g 8.  |t Redistribution.  |t Redistribution of income --  |t Differential transfers --  |t Nonmonetary redistribution --  |t Rent seeking and predation --  |t Intergenerational redistribution --  |t Redistribution and mobility --  |g 9.  |t Public goods.  |t Public goods -- the neoclassical approach --  |t Provision of public goods in practice --  |t Voluntary provision of public goods -- free riders and collective action --  |t Voluntary provision of public goods -- clubs --  |t The static public goods game --  |t The war of attrition in public goods provision --  |g 10.  |t Inaction, delay, and crisis.  |t Economic arguments --  |t Vested interests --  |t Nonadoption due to uncertainty about individual benefits --  |t "Communication" failures --  |t Conflict over the burden of reform --  |t Common property models --  |t Economic crises --  |g Part IV:  |t Application to policy issues.  |g 11.  |t Factor accumulation and growth.  |t Basic models of fiscal policy and capital accumulation --  |t Imperfect capital markets, externalities, and endogenous income distribution --  |t Political institutions and regimes --  |t Socio-political instability --  |t Empirical determinants of growth --  |g 12.  |t The international economy.  |g pt. 1.  |t Exchange-rate arrangements.  |t Fixed versus flexible exchange rates --  |t Currency crises and contagious speculative attacks --  |t Monetary unions --  |g pt. 2.  |t Macroeconomic interdependence.  |t International policy cooperation --  |t Political responses to external shocks --  |g pt. 3.  |t International capital and aid flows.  |t Capital controls --  |t Sovereign borrowing --  |t Foreign aid --  |g 13.  |t Economic reform and transition.  |t Defining the issues.  |t Economic and oolitical constraints --  |t The implications of magnitude -- a formal analysis --  |t Heterogeneity and political constraints --  |t Labor reallocation --  |t Privatization --  |t Price liberalization --  |g 14.  |t The size of government and the number of nations.  |t The scope of government --  |t The size of government -- government spending --  |t Government debt and deficits --  |t Budgetary rules and institutions --  |t The number of nations. 
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