Coercion, survival, and war : why weak states resist the United States /

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In asymmetric interstate conflicts, great powers have the capability to coerce weak states by threatening their survival-but not vice versa. It is therefore the great power that decides whether to escalate a conflict into a crisis by adopting a coercive strategy. In practice, however, the coercive s...

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Détails bibliographiques
Cote:Libro Electrónico
Auteur principal: Haun, Phil M. (Auteur)
Format: Électronique eBook
Langue:Inglés
Publié: Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, [2015]
Collection:Stanford security studies.
Sujets:
Asymmetric warfare > United States > Case studies.
Asymmetric warfare > Case studies.
Guerre asymétrique > États-Unis > Études de cas.
Guerre asymétrique > Études de cas.
HISTORY > Military > Other.
TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING > Military Science.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Security (National & International)
Asymmetric warfare.
Diplomatic relations.
Military policy.
United States > Military policy > Case studies.
United States > Foreign relations > Case studies.
États-Unis > Relations extérieures > Études de cas.
United States.
Electronic books.
Case studies.
Accès en ligne:Texto completo
Table des matières:
  • A theory of asymmetric interstate coercion
  • Survival and coercion failure
  • The United States vs. Iraq : the Gulf and Iraq Wars
  • The United States vs. Serbia : Bosnia and Kosovo
  • The United States vs. Libya : El Dorado Canyon, Pan Am flight 103, and WMD.

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