Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control.

Show other versions (1)

If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod-...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Call Number:Libro Electrónico
Main Author: Weber, Steve, 1961-
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:Inglés
Published: Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2014.
Series:Princeton legacy library.
Subjects:
Nuclear arms control > United States.
Nuclear arms control > Soviet Union.
Strategic forces > United States.
Strategic forces > Soviet Union.
Game theory.
Game Theory
Armes nucléaires > Contrôle > États-Unis.
Armes nucléaires > Contrôle > URSS.
Forces stratégiques > États-Unis.
Forces stratégiques > URSS.
Théorie des jeux.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > International Relations > General.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Government > International.
Nuclear arms control.
Strategic forces.
Soviet Union.
United States.
Online Access:Texto completo
Table of Contents:
  • List of Abbreviations ; Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Current Approaches; 3. Cooperation: A New Approach; 4. Antiballistic Missile Systems; 5. Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles; 6. Antisatellite Weapons; 7. Conclusion; References; Index.

Similar Items