Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control.

Mostrar otras versiones (1)

If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod-...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Weber, Steve, 1961-
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2014.
Colección:Princeton legacy library.
Temas:
Nuclear arms control > United States.
Nuclear arms control > Soviet Union.
Strategic forces > United States.
Strategic forces > Soviet Union.
Game theory.
Game Theory
Armes nucléaires > Contrôle > États-Unis.
Armes nucléaires > Contrôle > URSS.
Forces stratégiques > États-Unis.
Forces stratégiques > URSS.
Théorie des jeux.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > International Relations > General.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Government > International.
Nuclear arms control.
Strategic forces.
Soviet Union.
United States.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Descripción
Sumario:If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's ""tit for tat, "" only strategies based on an ideal type of ""enhanced contingent restraint"" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the
Notas:Cover; Contents.
Descripción Física:1 online resource (342 pages)
ISBN:9781400862436
1400862434
0691633509
9780691633503

Ejemplares similares