Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Preface
  • Contents
  • Introduction
  • The Object and Approach of This Book
  • Limitations
  • I A Theory of Regulation
  • 1 Typical Justifications for Regulation
  • The Control of Monopoly Power
  • Rent Control or Excess Profits
  • Compensating for Spillovers (Externalities)
  • Inadequate Information
  • Excessive Competition: The Empty Box
  • Other Justifications
  • The Mixture of Rationales
  • 2 Cost-or-Service Ratemaking
  • The System
  • The Problems
  • Conclusion
  • 3 Historically Based Price Regulation
  • The System
  • The Problems
  • Conclusion4 Allocation under a Public Interest Standard
  • The System
  • Conclusion
  • 5 Standard Setting
  • The System
  • Problems Inherent in the Process
  • Conclusion
  • 6 Historically Based Allocation
  • The System
  • The Need for Exceptions
  • The Exception Process
  • Conclusion
  • 7 Individualized Screening
  • The Food Additive Screening System
  • Problems with This Form of Regulation
  • Conclusion
  • 8 Alternatives to Classical Regulation
  • Unregulated Markets Policed by Antitrust
  • Disclosure
  • Taxes
  • The Creation of Marketable Property RightsChanges in Liability Rules
  • Bargaining
  • Nationalization
  • 9 General Guidelines for Policy Makers
  • II Appropriate Solutions
  • 10 Match and Mismatch
  • 11 Mismatch: Excessive Competition and Airline Regulation
  • The Industry
  • Regulation
  • Harmful Effects of Regulation
  • Mismatch as Cause
  • An Alternative to Classical Regulation
  • Conclusion
  • 12 Mismatch: Excessive Competition and the Trucking Industry
  • The Industry and Regulation
  • The Effects of Regulation
  • Alternatives to Classical RegulationConclusion
  • 13 Mismatch: Rent Control and Natural Gas Field Prices
  • The Industry
  • Regulation
  • Adverse Effects
  • The Mismatch and the Shortage
  • The Mismatch and Natural Gas Allocation
  • Alternatives
  • Conclusion
  • 14 Partial Mismatch: Spillovers and Environmental Pollution
  • The Problems of Standard Setting
  • Incentive-Based Systems: Taxes and Marketable Rights
  • Conclusion
  • 15 Problems of a Possible Match: Natural Monopoly and Telecommunications
  • The Characteristics of the Longline Problem
  • The FCC's Response to the ProblemThe Basic Choices
  • Conclusion
  • III Practical Reform
  • 16 From Candidate to Reform
  • The Elements of Implementation
  • The Kennedy Hearings
  • Conclusion
  • 17 Generic Approaches to Regulatory Reform
  • Better Personnel
  • Procedural Changes
  • Structural Change
  • Encouraging Substantive Refonn
  • Appendix 1 The Regulatory Agencies
  • Appendix 2 A Note on Administrative Law
  • Further Reading
  • Notes
  • Index