Thinking how to live /

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Philosophers have long suspected that thought and discourse about what we ought to do differ in some fundamental way from statements about what is. But the difference has proved elusive, in part because the two kinds of statement look alike. Focusing on judgments that express decisions--judgments ab...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Gibbard, Allan
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2003.
Temas:
Expressivism (Ethics)
Normativity (Ethics)
Émotivisme.
Norme (Morale)
PHILOSOPHY > Social.
PHILOSOPHY > Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
Alltag
Ethik
Soziales Handeln
Normen (menswetenschappen)
Praktische filosofie.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • I: Preliminaries
  • 1/ Introduction: a possibility proof
  • 2. Intuitionism as template: emending Moore
  • II: The thing to do
  • 3. Planning and ruling out: the Frege-Geach problem
  • 4. Judgment, disagreement, negation
  • 5. Supervenience and constitution
  • 6. Character and import
  • III: Normative concepts
  • 7. Ordinary oughts: meaning and motivation
  • 8. Normative kinds: patterns of engagement
  • 9. What to say about the thing to do: the expressivistic turn and what it gains us
  • IV: Knowing what to do
  • 10. Explaining with plans
  • 11. Knowing what to do
  • 12. Ideal response concepts
  • 13. Deep vindication and practical confidence
  • 14. Impasse and dissent.

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