The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box : electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies /

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Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in au...

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Détails bibliographiques
Cote:Libro Electrónico
Auteur principal: Higashijima, Masaaki (Auteur)
Format: Électronique eBook
Langue:Inglés
Publié: Ann Arbor, Michigan : University of Michigan Press, [2022]
Collection:Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies series.
Sujets:
Elections > Corrupt practices > Case studies.
Elections > Corrupt practices > Kazakhstan.
Elections > Corrupt practices > Kyrgyzstan.
Dictatorship > Case studies.
Dictatorship > Kazakhstan.
Dictatorship > Kyrgyzstan.
Corruption électorale > Études de cas.
Corruption électorale > Kazakhstan.
Dictature > Études de cas.
Dictature > Kazakhstan.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > General.
Dictatorship.
Elections > Corrupt practices.
Kazakhstan.
Kyrgyzstan.
Electronic books.
Case studies.
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