|
|
|
|
LEADER |
00000cam a2200000Mi 4500 |
001 |
EBSCO_ocn983744504 |
003 |
OCoLC |
005 |
20231017213018.0 |
006 |
m o d |
007 |
cr |n|---||||| |
008 |
170422t20172017dcu o 000 0 eng d |
040 |
|
|
|a EBLCP
|b eng
|e pn
|c EBLCP
|d YDX
|d MERUC
|d IDEBK
|d LLB
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCF
|d WRM
|d CEF
|d OTZ
|d N$T
|d AGLDB
|d IGB
|d OCLCQ
|d G3B
|d S8J
|d S8I
|d D6H
|d BTN
|d AUW
|d INTCL
|d MHW
|d SNK
|d CUS
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCO
|
019 |
|
|
|a 983018008
|a 983380476
|a 983646400
|a 984026831
|a 984252463
|a 984613984
|a 985229929
|a 985392852
|a 1264728261
|
020 |
|
|
|a 9781475590227
|q (electronic bk.)
|
020 |
|
|
|a 1475590229
|q (electronic bk.)
|
020 |
|
|
|z 1475590229
|
020 |
|
|
|z 1475590180
|
020 |
|
|
|z 9781475590180
|
024 |
7 |
|
|a 10.5089/9781475590180.001
|2 doi
|
029 |
1 |
|
|a AU@
|b 000067149705
|
035 |
|
|
|a (OCoLC)983744504
|z (OCoLC)983018008
|z (OCoLC)983380476
|z (OCoLC)983646400
|z (OCoLC)984026831
|z (OCoLC)984252463
|z (OCoLC)984613984
|z (OCoLC)985229929
|z (OCoLC)985392852
|z (OCoLC)1264728261
|
050 |
|
4 |
|a HJ8011
|b .C36 2017
|
072 |
|
7 |
|a BUS
|x 051000
|2 bisacsh
|
082 |
0 |
4 |
|a 336.34
|2 23
|
049 |
|
|
|a UAMI
|
100 |
1 |
|
|a Cantore, Cristiano,
|e author.
|
245 |
1 |
0 |
|a Optimal fiscal and monetary policy, debt crisis and management /
|c prepared by Cristiano Cantore [and three others].
|
264 |
|
1 |
|a [Washington, D.C.] :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c [2017]
|
264 |
|
4 |
|c ©2017
|
300 |
|
|
|a 1 online resource (45 pages)
|
336 |
|
|
|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
|
337 |
|
|
|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
|
338 |
|
|
|a online resource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
|
490 |
1 |
|
|a IMF working paper ;
|v WP/17/78
|
588 |
0 |
|
|a Print version record.
|
505 |
0 |
|
|a Cover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 The Model; 2.1 Households; 2.2 Firms; 2.3 Government; 2.4 Monetary policy; 2.5 Equilibrium; 2.6 Functional forms; 3 Calibration; 4 Optimal monetary and fiscal stabilisation policy; 4.1 The Ramsey problem and the LQ approximation; 4.2 Optimal monetary-fiscal rules for normal times; 4.2.1 Results; 4.3 Crisis management of debt: how fast, how deep?; 4.4 The role of nonlinearities, larger shocks and an interest-rate peg; 5 Introducing long-term government debt; 5.1 Results; 6 Conclusions; A Equilibrium conditions; A.1 Utility function and marginal utilities.
|
505 |
8 |
|
|a A.2 Consumption/savingA. 3 Investment; A.4 Wage setting; A.5 Production; A.6 Government; A.7 Monetary policy; A.8 Resource constraint; A.9 Autoregressive processes; B The Ramsey problem and the LQ approximation; C Data; D Moments; List of Tables; 1 Parameter values; 2 Optimal policy results for alternative government debt/GDP ratios; 3 Optimal policy results for B/4Y=0.7 allowing for superinertial monetary policy; 4 Optimal policy results for alternative government debt/GDP ratios allowing for long-term government debt; C.1 Data sources; C.2 Data transformations -- observables.
|
505 |
8 |
|
|a D.1 Moments of key macroeconomic variablesList of Figures; 1 Gross general government debt (% of GDP) in selected advanced economies (Source: Fiscal Monitor, October 2014, International Monetary Fund); 2 Cumulative density function of the fiscal limit; 3 Effects of a shock to the level of debt under each of the four regimes, and under each of the four debt scenarios; 4 Comparison of responses of linear and nonlinear models for a jump from debt/GDP of 90% to 105%; 5 Comparison of responses in the nonlinear model for a jump of debt/GDP of different magnitudes.
|
500 |
|
|
|a 6 Negative preference shock with an interest rate peg of various lengths7 Effects of a shock to the level of debt under optimal and time-consistent policy, and under each of the four debt scenarios, allowing for long-term government debt.
|
520 |
3 |
|
|a The initial government debt-to-GDP ratio and the government's commitment play a pivotal role in determining the welfare-optimal speed of fiscal consolidation in the management of a debt crisis. Under commitment, for low or moderate initial government debt-to-GPD ratios, the optimal consolidation is very slow. A faster pace is optimal when the economy starts from a high level of public debt implying high sovereign risk premia, unless these are suppressed via a bailout by official creditors. Under discretion, the cost of not being able to commit is reflected into a quick consolidation of government debt. Simple monetary-fiscal rules with passive fiscal policy, designed for an environment with "normal shocks", perform reasonably well in mimicking the Ramsey-optimal response to one-off government debt shocks. When the government can issue also long-term bonds-under commitment-the optimal debt consolidation pace is slower than in the case of short-term bonds only, and entails an increase in the ratio between long and short-term bonds.
|
590 |
|
|
|a eBooks on EBSCOhost
|b EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - Worldwide
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Debts, Public.
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Monetary policy.
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Fiscal policy.
|
650 |
|
6 |
|a Dettes publiques.
|
650 |
|
6 |
|a Politique monétaire.
|
650 |
|
6 |
|a Politique fiscale.
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
|x Public Finance.
|2 bisacsh
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Debts, Public
|2 fast
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Fiscal policy
|2 fast
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Monetary policy
|2 fast
|
776 |
0 |
8 |
|i Print version:
|a Cantore, Cristiano.
|t Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Debt Crisis and Management.
|d Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, ©2017
|z 9781475590180
|
830 |
|
0 |
|a IMF working paper ;
|v WP/17/78.
|
856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://ebsco.uam.elogim.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1505065
|z Texto completo
|
938 |
|
|
|a EBL - Ebook Library
|b EBLB
|n EBL4843270
|
938 |
|
|
|a EBSCOhost
|b EBSC
|n 1505065
|
938 |
|
|
|a ProQuest MyiLibrary Digital eBook Collection
|b IDEB
|n cis38048316
|
938 |
|
|
|a YBP Library Services
|b YANK
|n 14208670
|
994 |
|
|
|a 92
|b IZTAP
|