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Dictators and democracy in African development : the political economy of good governance in Nigeria /

This book argues that the structure of the policy-making process in Nigeria explains variations in government performance better than other commonly cited factors.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: LeVan, A. Carl
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New York : Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Colección:African studies series.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Half-title
  • Title page
  • Copyright information
  • Dedication
  • Table of contents
  • List of tables
  • List of figures
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • Government Performance in the Literature
  • The Regime Type Explanation: Does Democracy Deliver?
  • State Wealth: Poor States, Poor Performance?
  • Ethnicity Explanations: Primordialism and Parochialism
  • Leadership
  • An Alternative Explanation
  • The Structure of the Book
  • 1 A Theory of Institutions, Preferences, and Performance
  • Veto Player Theory: Defining the Terms
  • A Typology of Veto Players and Criteria for Identifying Them
  • Informal Institutions and Veto Power through Military Factions and Regional Vetoes
  • The Policy Consequences of Veto Players
  • Factors Determining Veto Player Impact
  • Formulating Hypotheses from the "Distributional" and "Commitment" Traditions
  • Conclusion
  • 2 Veto Players in Nigeria's Political History since Independence
  • Two Veto Players in the First Republic's First Government (1960-1964)
  • Coalition Collapse and the First Republic under a Single Veto Player (1965)
  • Education Policy Performance and Student/Teacher Ratios
  • Local Collective Goods and Government Consumption
  • Predicting Nigeria's Policy Performance with Veto Players
  • Controlling for Intervening Factors
  • Testing the Coordination Hypothesis
  • Testing the Logroll Hypothesis
  • Nigeria's Madisonian Dilemma
  • A Qualitative Examination of Policy Performance, 1961-2007
  • Postcolonial and Postwar Government Performance
  • The Second Republic and Nigeria's Second Attempt at Democracy
  • Authoritarian Rule: The Long Stretch, 1983-1999
  • The Return of Democracy, the Return of Obasanjo
  • Pressure Builds for a Transition and a Fourth Veto Player Emerges (1990-1993)
  • Abacha after the Failed Transition: From Two Veto Players to One (1993-1998)
  • Obasanjo's Return: Four Veto Players for the Fourth Republic (1999-2003)
  • Obasanjo's Second Term and Institutionalization under Three Veto Players (2003-2007)
  • Conclusion
  • 3 The Impact of Nigeria's Veto Players on Local and National Collective Goods
  • National and Local Collective Goods as Measures of Government Performance
  • Macroeconomic Performance
  • Judicial Performance
  • The Aguiyi-Ironsi Regime: A Dictator's Ambitions Checked by a Regional Veto (1966)
  • Yakubu Gowon Contends with a Military Council Veto (1966-1975)
  • Mohammed/Obasanjo: Three Veto Players and an Unexpected Succession (1975-1979)
  • Partisan and Presidential Veto Players during the Second Republic (1979-1981)
  • Three Institutional Veto Players and the Second Republic's Swift Decline (1982-1983)
  • A Veto from Buhari, a Veto from Idiagbon (1984-1985)
  • A Triumvirate of Veto Players during Babangida's Early Years (1985-1990)