Impassioned belief /

We all form judgments about what ways of life are worthwhile, what we are morally required to do and so on. These so-called "normative" judgments have seemed puzzling in part because they exhibit both belief-like and desire-like features. Traditional cognitivist theories hold that these ju...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Ridge, Michael
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Oxford : Oxford Scholarship Online, 2014.
Temas:
Norm (Philosophy)
Practical judgment.
Practical reason.
Norme (Philosophie)
Jugement pratique.
Raison pratique.
PHILOSOPHY > Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
PHILOSOPHY > Social.
Practical judgment
Practical reason
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Impassioned Belief
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgements
  • Introduction
  • Chapter 1: Locating Normative Thought and Discourse
  • Chapter 2: Normative Thought and Discourse: Affective, Action-Guiding, and Acrimonious
  • Chapter 3: Ecumenical Cognitivism
  • Chapter 4: Introducing Ecumenical Expressivism
  • Chapter 5: Compositionality, Inference, and the Frege-Geach Problem
  • Chapter 6: Disagreement
  • Chapter 7: Truth
  • Chapter 8: Rationality
  • 1: Locating Normative Thought and Discourse
  • 1. Practically Normative Thought and Discourse: A Functional Gloss2. Evaluatives
  • 3. Directives
  • 4. Reasons
  • 5. Locating the Normative
  • Conclusion
  • 2: Normative Thought and Discourse: Affective, Action-Guiding, and Acrimonious
  • 1. Normative Judgment: Action-Guiding
  • 2. Normative Judgment: Affective
  • 3. Normative Judgment: Acrimonious
  • Conclusion
  • 3: Ecumenical Cognitivism
  • 1. The Many Ecumenical Cognitivisms
  • 2. Implicative Ecumenical Cognitivism
  • 3. Judgment-Individuating Ecumenical Cognitivism
  • Conclusion
  • 4: Introducing Ecumenical Expressivism1. The Expressivist Gambit
  • 2. Pragmatics, Semantics, and Meta-Semantics
  • 3. Ideationalism and Normative Propositions
  • 4. Normative Perspectives: The Power of Negative Thinking
  • 5. Normative Judgment
  • 6. Normative Propositions
  • 7. Advantages of Ecumenical Expressivism
  • Conclusion
  • 5: Compositionality, Inference, and the Frege-Geach Problem
  • 1. What is the Frege-Geach Problem?
  • 2. Unasserted Contexts and Compositionality: Non-Ecumenical Expressivism
  • 3. Solving the Frege-Geach Problem: Offloading Logical Complexity4. Logical Validity: A First Pass
  • 5. Logical Validity: Formality Regained
  • 6. Intensional Contexts and Implicatures
  • 7. Wishful Thinking
  • Conclusion
  • 6: Disagreement
  • 1. Disagreement in Attitude
  • 1.1 Mere difference without disagreement
  • 1.2 Non-linguistic agents
  • 1.3 Why privilege belief and desire?
  • 1.4 Agent-relativity
  • 2. Disagreement in Plan
  • 2.1 Difference versus disagreement
  • 2.2 Circularity
  • 2.3 From practice to theory: a gap in the argument?
  • 2.4 Impasse3. Disagreement in Prescription
  • 4. Ecumenical Expressivism and Disagreement in Prescription
  • Conclusion
  • 7: Truth
  • 1. Ecumenical Expressivism, Truth-Aptness, and Subjectivism
  • 2. The Deflationist Gambit
  • 3. The Truth in Ecumenical Expressivism
  • 4. Advantages of this Approach
  • 5. The Explosion of the Normative?
  • 6. What if Soames is Wrong?
  • Conclusion
  • 8: Rationality
  • 1. Rational Capacities
  • 2. Rationality as a Success Notion
  • 3. Ecumenical Cognitivism Revisited
  • 4. Discontinuities Revisited
  • Conclusion

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