In praise of desire /

'In Praise of Desire' aims to show that ordinary desires belong at the heart of moral psychology, basing its thesis on a doctrine called Spare Conativism. It gives a full defence of the central role intrinsic desires have in our moral lives.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autores principales: Arpaly, Nomy (Autor), Schroeder, Timothy (Autor)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2014.
Colección:Oxford moral theory.
Temas:
Desire (Philosophy)
Ethics.
Virtue.
Virtues.
Ethics
Désir (Philosophie)
Morale.
Vertus.
ethics (philosophy)
PHILOSOPHY > Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
Virtue
Virtues
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • 1.1 Moral Psychology 1
  • 1.2 Reason and Appetite 2
  • 1.3 Intrinsic, Instrumental, and Realizer Desires 6
  • 1.4 The Many Guises of the Good 14
  • 1.5 The Work to Be Done 16
  • Part I Reason
  • 1 Deliberation 19
  • 1.1 The Nature of Deliberation 21
  • 1.2 The Rationality of Acts of Deliberation 26
  • 1.3 Deliberation and Regress 29
  • 1.4 Other Objections 33
  • 1.5 Deliberative Exceptionalism 36
  • 1.6 Is There an Ambiguity? 37
  • 1.7 If Not Deliberation, Then Representation? 40
  • 1.8 Thinking and Acting for Reasons without Deliberation 42
  • 2 How Deliberation Works 43
  • 2.1 The Role of Deliberation 43
  • 2.2 How Deliberation Works 47
  • 2.3 The Moral of the Story 50
  • 3 Thinking and Acting for Reasons 53
  • 3.1 Objective Reasons and Rationalizing Reasons 53
  • 3.2 Physical Properties, Contents, and Reasons 56
  • 3.3 Because of Reasons 61
  • 3.4 Reasons, Causes, and Mountain Climbers 67
  • 3.5 Acting for Bad Reasons 72
  • 3.6 Thinking and Acting for Multiple Reasons and Nonreasons 75
  • 3.7 Habit and Inaction 80
  • 3.8 Acting for Moral Reasons 86
  • Part II Desire
  • 4 Love and Care 93
  • 4.1 Love 93
  • 4.2 Care 104
  • 5 What Desires Are Not 110
  • 5.1 Action Is Not the Essence of Desire 111
  • 5.2 Feeling Is Not the Essence of Desire 116
  • 6 What Desires Are 126
  • 6.1 The Reward and Punishment Systems 127
  • 6.2 The Reward System Causes What Desires Cause 137
  • 6.3 Intrinsic Desires are a Natural Kind 143
  • 6.4 Solutions and Promissory Notes 146
  • Part III Virtue
  • 7 Credit and Blame 159
  • 7.1 Attributability and Accountability 159
  • 7.2 Good Will and Ill Will 162
  • 7.3 A Theory of Praise-and Blameworthiness 169
  • 7.4 Side Constraints 171
  • 7.5 Conceptualization 176
  • 7.6 Too Much Credit, Too Much Blame 187
  • 7.7 Partial Good and 111 Will 194
  • 8 Virtue 200
  • 8.1 A Theory of Virtue 202
  • 8.2 The Theory Applied 203
  • 8.3 Virtues and Their Effects 206
  • 8.4 Virtue and Involuntary Attitudes: Two Alternative Views 215
  • 8.5 Virtuous Irrationality 219
  • 8.6 The Unity of the Virtues 221
  • 9 Virtue and Cognition 225
  • 9.1 Familiar Cognitive Effects of Desire 226
  • 9.2 The Effects of Good Will on Cognition 231
  • 9.3 The Vice of Being Prejudiced 233
  • 9.4 The Vice of Being Close-Minded 239
  • 9.5 The Virtue of Being Open-Minded 241
  • 9.6 Modesty and Immodesty 245
  • 9.7 Vicious Dreams 250
  • Part IV Puzzles
  • 10 Inner Struggle 259
  • 10.1 Akrasia 259
  • 10.2 The Experience of Inner Struggle 261
  • 10.3 Inner Struggle Explained 265
  • 11 Addiction 274
  • 11.1 The Puzzle 274
  • 11.2 The Science of Addiction 276
  • 11.3 The Philosophy of Addiction 285
  • 11.4 The Blameworthiness of Addicts 287
  • 11.5 Addiction in Moral Psychology 289.

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