Personal identity : complex or simple? /

This book addresses whether personal identity is analyzable, with innovative discussion of 'complex' and 'simple' theories.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Otros Autores: Gasser, Georg, Stefan, Matthias
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge [England] ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Temas:
Identity (Psychology)
Identité (Psychologie)
PHILOSOPHY > Mind & Body.
PSYCHOLOGY > Personality.
Identität
Persönlichkeitstheorie
Jaget.
Identitet (psykologi)
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • PERSONAL IDENTITY
  • Title
  • Illustrations
  • Contributors
  • Introduction
  • THE PROJECT
  • THE QUESTION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
  • THE DEBATE ABOUT PERSONAL IDENTITY
  • THE BIOLOGICAL APPROACH
  • THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH
  • TWO PROBLEMS FOR COMPLEX APPROACHES
  • FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM
  • THE SIMPLE VIEW
  • CONCLUSION
  • PART I. : Framing the question
  • 1. Chitchat on personal identity
  • 2. In search of the simple view
  • SIMPLE AND COMPLEX VIEWS
  • PRELIMINARIES
  • GROUNDING AND CRITERIA
  • ANTI-CRITERIALISM
  • ANALYZABILITY
  • ADVOCATES OF ANALYTIC CRITERIALISM.
  • EMPIRICIST THEORIESBRUTENESS
  • NOONAN'S PROPOSAL
  • SPECIFIC AND UNSPECIFIC
  • EXPLANATORY DEMANDS
  • 3. Personal identity, indeterminacy and obligation
  • PERSONAL IDENTITY AND INDETERMINACY
  • INDETERMINACY AND OBLIGATION
  • INDETERMINACY AND MORAL DILEMMAS
  • OBJECTIONS TO EPISTEMICISM
  • INDETERMINACY AND SUBJECTIVISM
  • 4. Personal identity and its perplexities
  • INTRODUCTION
  • THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
  • THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SIMPLE AND THE COMPLEX VIEW OF DIACHRONIC PERSONAL IDENTITY
  • THE INDEXICALITY OF THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON
  • THE COMPLEX VIEW AND INDETERMINACY.
  • PART II. : Arguments for and against simplicity
  • 5. : How to determine which is the true
  • THE PROBLEM
  • LOGICAL POSSIBILITY
  • A POSTERIORI METAPHYSICAL POSSIBILITY
  • THE HUMAN SOUL
  • 6. Against simplicity
  • I
  • II
  • III
  • IV
  • V
  • 7. The probable simplicity of personal identity
  • WHY SHOULD WE SEEK A CRITERION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
  • IDENTITY FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW
  • WHAT IS A PERSON
  • LOCKE'S CRITERION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
  • THE FATAL CIRCULARITY IN ANY NEO-LOCKEAN CRITERION
  • REPLY TO AN OBJECTION
  • 8. Reply to E.J. Lowe.
  • 9. The non-descriptive individual nature of conscious beingsINTRODUCTION
  • THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS AND METAPHYSICAL BASES OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S EXISTENCE
  • NON-DESCRIPTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR AN INDIVIDUAL'S EXISTENCE
  • THE INDIVIDUAL NATURE OF A STONE
  • PERFECT COUNTERPARTS OF CONSCIOUS INDIVIDUALS
  • THE CENTRAL CONCEPTUAL DISANALOGY
  • CLARIFICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTUAL DISANALOGY CLAIM
  • THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE EXISTENCE OF CONSCIOUS INDIVIDUALS
  • IMPLICIT CONCEPTS AND PHILOSOPHICAL INSIGHTS
  • ACCESS TO THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUS BEINGS ON THE BASIS OF BEING A CONSCIOUS BEING.
  • PART III. : Reconsidering simplicity
  • 10. : Personal identity: a not-so-simple simple view
  • WHAT IS A SIMPLE VIEW OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
  • A FIRST-PERSONAL APPROACH
  • WHY NOT-SO-SIMPLE
  • DO PERSONS HAVE PARTS
  • WHY THERE ARE NO INFORMATIVE CRITERIA OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
  • OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
  • CONCLUSION
  • 11. Is "person" a sortal term
  • INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
  • "PERSON" IS A SORTAL TERM
  • THE DON'T CARE VIEW
  • "PERSON" IS A SEMANTICALLY UNIQUE TERM
  • THE KIND OF PERSONS
  • THE INDIVIDUAL FORM OF PERSONS
  • THE UNITY-OF-CONSCIOUSNESS ARGUMENT.
  • 12. Materialism, dualism, and "simple" theories of personal identity.

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