Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation /

Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; vo...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Call Number:Libro Electrónico
Main Author: Taylor, Alan D., 1947-
Corporate Author: Mathematical Association of America
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:Inglés
Published: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Series:Outlooks.
Subjects:
Voting > Mathematical models.
Social choice > Mathematical models.
Political science > Mathematical models.
Game theory.
Game Theory
Vote > Modèles mathématiques.
Choix collectif > Modèles mathématiques.
Science politique > Modèles mathématiques.
Théorie des jeux.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Political Process > Elections.
Game theory
Political science > Mathematical models
Social choice > Mathematical models
Voting > Mathematical models
Verkiezingen.
Kiesgedrag.
Strategische aspecten.
Social choice.
Wiskundige modellen.
Speltheorie.
Online Access:Texto completo

Internet

Texto completo

Items no disponibles

Holdings details from

Similar Items