The political economy of reform /

"In this book, Federico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi propose formal models to answer some of the questions raised by the recent reform experience of many Latin American and eastern European countries." "The book is organized around three basic questions: first, why do reforms take...

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Bibliographic Details
Call Number:Libro Electrónico
Other Authors: Sturzenegger, Federico, Tommasi, Mariano, 1964-
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:Inglés
Published: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©1998.
Subjects:
Economic stabilization > Developing countries.
Economic stabilization > Developing countries > Mathematical models.
Stabilisation économique > Pays en voie de développement.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Public Policy > Economic Policy.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Government & Business.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Development > Economic Development.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Development > Business Development.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Structural Adjustment.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Development > General.
Economic policy
Economic policy > Mathematical models
Economic stabilization
Economic stabilization > Mathematical models
Economische hervormingen.
Economische stabiliteit.
Business & Economics.
Economic History.
Developing countries > Economic policy.
Developing countries > Economic policy > Mathematical models.
Pays en voie de développement > Politique économique.
Developing countries
Ontwikkelingslanden.
Online Access:Texto completo
Table of Contents:
  • 1. Introduction
  • I. Why? (The positive political economy reform) ; 2. The political economy of delayed reform ; 3. Resistance to reform: Status quo bias in the presance of individual-specific uncertainty ; 4. Why are stablizations delayed? ; 5. Fiscal conservatism as a response to the debt crisis ; 6. The benefit of crises for economic reform ; 7. Recurrent high inflation and stablization: A dynamic game ; 8. The common property approach to the political economy of fiscal policy ; 9. Fiscal discipline in a union ; 10. The rush to free trade in the developing world: Why so late? Why now? Will it last?
  • II. How? (Strategies for reformers) ; 11. The design of reform packages under uncertainty ; 12. Gradualism versus big-bang: Speed and sustainability of reforms ; 13. Sequencing of economic reforms in the presence of political constraints
  • III. Who? (The identity of reformers) ; 14. Promises, promises: Credible policy reform via signalling ; 15. Credibility of policymakers and of economic reforms ; 16. The feasibility of low inflation: Theory with an application to the Argentine case
  • Index.

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