Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America The Political Culture of Cheating and Compliance in Argentina and Chile.
Call Number: | Libro Electrónico |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Electronic eBook |
Language: | Inglés |
Published: |
University Park :
Penn State University Press,
2015.
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Texto completo |
Table of Contents:
- Intro
- Title Page
- Copyright
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1. Compliance and Enforcement
- 2. Measuring Tax Compliance in Chile and Argentina
- 3. Taxpayers' Perceptions of Government Enforcement
- 4. General Deterrence: Impunity and Sanctions in Taxation
- 5. Specific Deterrence and Its Effects on Individual Compliance
- 6. The Role of Trust, Reciprocity, and Solidarity in Tax Compliance
- 7. Social Mechanisms in Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance
- Conclusion: Tax Compliance and the Law
- Appendix A: On the Data
- Appendix B: A Game Theory Approach to the Logic of Tax Compliance
- Appendix C: A Simulative Game: The Effects of Enforcement
- Appendix D: The State, the Law, and the Rule of Law
- Notes
- References
- Index
- Back Cover