Corporate Power in Australian Democracy Do the 1% Rule?.

Bibliographic Details
Call Number:Libro Electrónico
Main Author: Edwards, Lindy
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:Inglés
Published: Melbourne : Monash University Publishing, 2020.
Subjects:
Corporate power > Australia.
Economic policy.
Pouvoir économique > Australie.
Politique économique.
Corporate power
Economic policy
Australia
Online Access:Texto completo
Table of Contents:
  • Front Cover
  • Title Page
  • About the Author
  • About this Book
  • Imprint and Copyright Information
  • Contents
  • List of Figures and Tables
  • Table 1.1: Proportion of Big Three Miners' Preferences Achieved
  • Table 1.2: Public-interest Case for Big Three Miners' Preferences Achieved
  • Table 1.3: Democratic Momentum Miners' Preferences Achieved
  • Table 1.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power
  • Table 2.1: Proportion of Banks' Preferences Achieved
  • Table 2.2: Public-interest Case for Bank Preferences Achieved
  • Table 2.3: Democratic Momentum for Banks' Preferences Achieved
  • Table 2.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power
  • Table 3.1: Proportion of Telstra's Preferences Achieved
  • Table 3.2: Public-interest Case for Telstra's Preferences Achieved
  • Table 3.3: Democratic Momentum for Telstra's Preferences Achieved
  • Table 3.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power
  • Table 4.1: Proportion of News Corp Australia's Preferences Achieved
  • Table 4.2: Public-interest Case for News Corp Australia' Preferences Achieved
  • Table 4.3: Democratic Momentum for News Corp Preferences Achieved
  • Table 4.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power
  • Table 5.1: Proportion of Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved
  • Table 5.2: Public-interest Case for Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved
  • Table 5.3: Democratic Momentum for Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved
  • Table 5.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power
  • Table 6.1: Proportion of Big Business Preferences Achieved
  • Table 6.2: Public-interest Case for Big Business Preferences Achieved
  • Table 6.3: Democratic Momentum for Big Business Preferences Achieved
  • Table 6.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power
  • Table 7.1: Proportion of Big Business Preferences Achieved
  • Table 7.2: Public-interest Case for Big Business Preferences Achieved
  • Table 7.3: Democratic Momentum for Big Business Preferences Achieved
  • Table 7.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power
  • Figure 2.1: Indicative Map of Future of Financial Advice Stakeholders
  • Figure 4.1: Indicative Map of Media Stakeholders
  • Acknowledgements
  • Introduction
  • Part 1: A Fiercely Contested Battleground
  • Chapter 1. The Big Miners and the Mining Tax: The Benchmark Case
  • Chapter 2. Banks and the Financial Advice Reforms
  • Chapter 3. Telstra and the National Broadband Network
  • Chapter 4. News Corp and Media Reform
  • Part 2: An Unexpected Turn
  • Chapter 5. Supermarkets versus the Farmers
  • Chapter 6. Unfair Contracts
  • Chapter 7. Abuse of Market Power and the Culpability of Neoliberalism
  • Conclusion

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