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The Blackwell companion to substance dualism /
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Otros Autores: | , , |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Hoboken, NJ :
Wiley,
2018.
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| Colección: | Blackwell companions to philosophy.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Intro; Blackwell Companions to Philosophy; Title Page; Copyright; Notes on Contributors; Chapter 1: Introduction: Substance Dualism and Its Physicalist Rivals; 1.1 An Inconceivable Book?; 1.2 From Standard to Emergent Physicalism; 1.3 The Soul Reconsidered; 1.4 The Return of the Subject: Broad Implications for Naturalism; 1.5 Structure of the Book; 1.6 The Chapters in Brief; References; Chapter 2: Redressing Substance Dualism; 2.1 Arguments for Materialism; 2.2 Objections to Substance Dualism; 2.3 The Interaction Problem; 2.4 Objections ; 2.5 Churchland's Added Objections.
- 2.6 The Remaining Objections2.7 Property Dualism; 2.8 Property Dualism's Special Problems; 2.9 Property Dualism Scorecard; 2.10 Conclusion; References; Further Reading; Part I: Articulating Substance Dualism; Chapter 3: Substance Dualism: A Defense; 3.1 Substance Dualism; 3.2 The Primacy of the Mental; 3.3 A Modal Argument for Substance Dualism; References; Further Reading; Debating Emergent Dualism; Chapter 4: The Case for Emergent Dualism; References; Chapter 5: Against Emergent Dualism; 5.1 What is Emergent Dualism?; 5.2 Problems for Emergent Dualism; 5.3 Conclusion; References.
- Debating Thomistic DualismChapter 6: Aquinas on the Human Soul; 6.1 What a Substance is; 6.2 What a Rational Animal is; 6.3 What the Soul is; References; Chapter 7: In Defense of a Thomistic-like Dualism; 7.1 What is Thomistic-like Dualism?; 7.2 Three Reasons Embracing an Immaterial Substantial Self is Superior to Physicalism; 7.3 Advantages of Thomistic-like Dualism (Organicism) Over Other Substance Dualisms; 7.4 Arguments Against Thomistic-like Substance Dualism; References; Chapter 8: A Critique of Thomistic Dualism; 8.1 A Summary of Aquinas's View; 8.2 Objections to Thomistic Dualism.
- 8.3 A Modified Thomistic View8.4 A Way Forward?; References; Debating Cartesian Dualism; Chapter 9: Cartesian Substance Dualism; I; II; III; IV; V; References; Chapter 10: Against Cartesian Dualism; 10.1 Descartes's Substance Dualism; 10.2 Why Minds and Bodies are Distinct: Some Arguments; 10.3 Descartes on Mind-Body Interaction; 10.4 Princess Elisabeth versus Descartes; 10.5 The Pairing Problema : Another Causal Argument; 10.6 Immaterial Minds in Space?; 10.7 Substance Dualism and Property Dualism; References; Chapter 11: Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism.
- 11.1 The Self as a Psychological Substance11.2 The Self as a Bearer of Physical Characteristics; 11.3 The Self as a Simple Substance; 11.4 Physicalism, Naturalism, and the Self; Acknowledgment; References; Debating the Unity of Consciousness; Chapter 12: Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness; 12.1 What is the Unity of Consciousness?; 12.2 Why are these Unity-of-Consciousness Theses a Problem?; 12.3 What, If Anything, Grounds the Three Types of Unity, Especially Subsumptive Phenomenal Unity?