Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy.

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Susanne Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most important intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She reconstructs the theory and discusses how the Stoics (third century BC to second century AD) justified it, and how it relates to their v...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Bobzien, Susanne
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Oxford : Oxford University Press, UK, 1999.
Temas:
Stoics.
Free will and determinism > History.
Stoïcisme.
Libre arbitre et déterminisme > Histoire.
stoicism.
Free will and determinism
Stoics
History
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Contents
  • Abbreviations
  • INTRODUCTION
  • 1 DETERMINISM AND FATE
  • 1.1 Physical and ontological foundations
  • 1.1.1 The active principle
  • 1.1.2 Causation
  • 1.1.3 Motions and qualitative states
  • 1.2 Teleological determinism defined
  • 1.3 Causal determinism defined
  • 1.3.1 The anti-Stoic argument for spontaneous motions
  • 1.3.2 Chrysippus' reply
  • 1.3.3 Causal determinism
  • 1.4 Fate
  • 1.4.1 Fate is God is Providence is Nature is the Active Principle . . .
  • 1.4.2 The main aspects of fate
  • 1.4.3 Teleological and mechanical aspects of Stoic determinism combined1.4.4 The Fate Principle
  • 2 TWO CHRYSIPPEAN ARGUMENTS FOR CAUSAL DETERMINISM
  • 2.1 Causal determinism and the Principle of Bivalence
  • 2.1.1 Chrysippus' Bivalence Argument
  • 2.1.2 Chrysippus versus Epicurus on truth and fate
  • 2.2 Causal determinism and prediction
  • 2.2.1 Chrysippus' concept of divination
  • 2.2.2 Chrysippus' proof of fate through the existence of divination
  • 2.2.3 Causal determinism as necessary condition for the existence of divination
  • 3 MODALITY, DETERMINISM, AND FREEDOM3.1 Modal logic and the threat of determinism
  • 3.1.1 Hellenistic modalities in general
  • 3.1.2 Diodorus and necessitarianism
  • 3.1.3 Philo and conceptual or essentialist modalities
  • 3.1.4 Chrysippus' modal system
  • 3.1.5 Contingency and freedom
  • 3.1.6 Appendix: Identification of Chrysippus' modal notions
  • 3.2 Objection: Stoic determinism and Stoic modal logic are incompatible
  • 3.3 A Stoic reply: fate and epistemic modalities
  • 3.4 Chrysippus' distinction between Necessity and that which is necessary
  • 3.4.1 The textual evidence3.4.2 Necessity and that which is necessary and their relation to fate
  • 4 DIVINATION, MODALITY, AND UNIVERSAL REGULARITY
  • 4.1 Objection: divination and Stoic contingency are incompatible
  • 4.1.1 The divinatory theorem
  • 4.1.2 The second argument against the Stoics
  • 4.1.3 The first argument against the Stoics
  • 4.1.4 The relation between the two arguments
  • 4.1.5 Chrysippus' modal notions conflict with divination
  • 4.2 Chrysippus' reply: active causation versus regularity of occurrents
  • 4.2.1 Negated conjunctions in lieu of conditionals4.2.2 Divinatory theorems, sign-relations, and causation
  • 4.2.3 A modification of the anti-Stoic objection
  • 4.2.4 Divination, determinism, and human action
  • 4.2.5 Appendix: Conditional predictions
  • 5 FATE, ACTION, AND MOTIVATION: THE IDLE ARGUMENT
  • 5.1 The Idle Argument
  • 5.1.1 Exposition of the argument
  • 5.1.2 The plausibility of the argument
  • 5.1.3 Futility and goal-directed activity
  • 5.1.4 Is the Idle Argument a sophism?
  • 5.2 Replies to the Idle Argument: the sources

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