Cooperative Extensions of the Bayesian Game.
This is the very first comprehensive monograph in a burgeoning, new research area - the theory of cooperative game with incomplete information with emphasis on the solution concept of Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibrium that encompasses the concept of the Bayesian incentive compatible c...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Singapore :
World Scientific Publishing Company,
2006.
|
| Colección: | Series on Mathematical Economics & Game Theory.
|
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Contents
- Preface
- I BASIC INGREDIENTS
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Cooperative Extension of the Bayesian Game
- 2.1 Formal Model
- 2.2 Examples
- 2.3 Two Approaches to Formulate Incomplete Information
- 3 Measurability as Feasibility of Individual Actions
- 3.1 General Case 3.2 Private Information Case Fully Pooled Information Case
- 4 Bayesian Incentive Compatibility as Feasibility of Execution of Contracts
- 4.1 Private Information Case
- 4.2 Mediator-Based Approach
- 4.3 Communication Plan as a Part of a Strategy
- II SOLUTIONS INFORMATION REVELATION 5 Descriptive Solution Concepts
- 5.1 Interim Solution Concepts
- 5.2 Ex Ante Solution Concepts
- 5.3 Other Interactive Modes
- 5.4 Coexistence of Coalitions
- 6 Normative Solution Concepts
- 6.1 Interim Efficiency Concepts
- 6.2 Coexistence of Coalitions 7 Comparisons of Several Core Concepts
- 7.1 Fine Core and Ex Post Core
- 7.2 Private Measurability and Bayesian Incentive Compatibility
- 8 Existence
- 8.1 Interim Solutions
- 8.2 Ex Ante Solutions
- 8.A Appendix to Chapter 8
- 9 Approaches to Information Revelation 9.1 By Contract Execution
- 9.2 By Contract Execution: A Profit-Center Game with Incomplete Information
- 9.3 By Choosing a Contract
- 9.4 Update of Interim Probabilities


