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Institutional Inertia.
We study the relative efficiency of outside-owned versus employee-owned firms and analyze implications for institutional change in a context of technological innovation. When decisions are made through majority voting, the vote on technology choice is used to influence the later vote on the sharing...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Washington :
International Monetary Fund,
2009.
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| Colección: | IMF Working Papers.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. A Tale of Explorers, Gold, and Diamonds; III. The Model; A. The Cooperative; 1. Redistribution (date 2 vote); 2. Technology choice (date 1 vote); 3. Example: Voting for an inefficient polarized technology; B. Outside Ownership; C. Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership; IV. Institutional Inertia; V. Discussion; A. Supporting Evidence; B. Implications for Institutional Design; VI. Concluding Remarks; References; Footnotes.