A companion to Donald Davidson /

A Companion to Donald Davidson presents newly commissioned essays by leading figures within contemporary philosophy. Taken together, they provide a comprehensive overview of Davidson's work across its full range, and an assessment of his many contributions to philosophy. Highlights the breadth...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Otros Autores: LePore, Ernest, 1950- (Editor )
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Chichester, West Sussex : Wiley Blackwell, 2013.
Colección:Blackwell companions to philosophy ; 53.
Temas:
Davidson, Donald, > 1917-2003.
Davidson, Donald, > 1917-2003
PHILOSOPHY > History & Surveys > Modern.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Title page
  • Copyright page
  • Contents
  • Notes on Contributors
  • Introduction: Life and Work
  • Life, Early Career, and the First Phrase of Davidson's Work through 1969
  • Second Phrase of Davidson's Work, 1970-1981
  • Third Phase of Davidson's Work from the 1980s On
  • Organization and Contents of the Volume
  • Bibliography
  • Part I: Action Theory
  • 1: Action Explanation
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Actions and Their Rationalization
  • 3. Davidson's Challenge and the Problem of Wayward Causal Chains
  • 4. The Logical Connection Argument
  • 5. Reasons as Causes?
  • 6. The Role of Laws in Action Explanations and the Causal Relevance of Mental Properties
  • 7. Singular Causal Statements and Causal Explanations
  • 8. Strict Laws, Generalizations, and Causal Concepts
  • 9. Causal Powers
  • 10. Propositional Attitudes as Causal Powers
  • 11. The Explanatory Value of Action Explanations
  • Acknowledgements
  • References
  • 2: Practical Reason
  • 1. Three Degrees of Complexity
  • 2. The Partitioned Model
  • 3. Davidson's View
  • 4. Final Thoughts: Why Not Partition?
  • References
  • 3: Action Individuation
  • 1. Modifiers and Multiple Things Done
  • 2. Primitive Actions
  • 3. The Competition: Actions as Fine Grained
  • 4. Preliminary Objections
  • 5. "By," Cause, and Time
  • 6. Deeper Problems
  • 7. Actions as Extended Processes
  • Conclusion
  • References
  • 4: Freedom to Act
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Davidson's Interest in His Work on Freedom
  • 3. Davidson's Project and Its Relationship to Moore and Austin
  • 4. Methodological Problems for Conditional Analyses
  • 5. The Analysis of Freedom to Act and Abilities to Do x
  • 6. Subjective Conditions and the Thinness of Davidson's Analysis
  • 7. Concluding Discussion: The Challenge for a Causal Theory of Action
  • References
  • 5: Intention
  • 1. The Initial Account
  • 2. Agency.
  • 3. Weakness of Will
  • 4. Intending
  • References
  • Part II: Metaphysics
  • 6: Event Variables and Their Values
  • 1. Quantifying over Events
  • 1.1. Implications and logical form
  • 1.2. Adverb reduction as conjunction reduction
  • 1.3. Enough but not too many
  • 2. Events to Quantify Over
  • 2.1. Ordering participants
  • 2.2. Timing
  • 2.3. Intentions
  • 2.4. Perspectives and direct objects
  • 3. Logical Form and Grammatical Form
  • 3.1. Thematic decomposition
  • 3.2. Grades of decomposition
  • 3.3. Thematic separation
  • 3.4. Conclusion
  • References
  • 7: Causation
  • 1. Actions, Reasons, and Causes
  • 2. Mental Causes
  • 3. Difficulties With This Account
  • 4. Another Look at Davidson
  • 5. Causation and Mental Causation
  • 6. Concluding Remarks
  • References
  • 8: Davidson's "Method of Truth" in Metaphysics
  • References
  • 9: The Concept of Truth
  • 1. Tarski, Truth, and Meaning
  • 2. Satisfaction and Correspondence
  • 3. Radical Interpretation and Coherence
  • 4. Defining Truth and Deflationism
  • 5. Objectivity and Truth
  • References
  • Part III: Philosophy of Language
  • 10: Truth in the Theory of Meaning
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Compositionality
  • 3. Criticism of Traditional Approaches
  • 4. The Positive Proposal
  • 5. Problematic Passages?
  • 6. Later Work
  • 7. Conclusion
  • References
  • 11: Parataxis
  • 1. Indirect Discourse
  • 1.1 Samesaying
  • 1.2 Virtues of the paratactic account
  • 1.3 Some problems for the paratactic account of indirect speech reports
  • 2 Mood and Mood-Setting
  • 3. Quotation
  • 4. A Parting Shot
  • References
  • 12: Logical Form
  • 1. The Idea of Logical Form and Its Philosophical Significance
  • 2. Constraints on Accounts of Logical Form
  • 3. Davidson's Account of Logical Form
  • 4. Criticisms
  • Acknowledgment
  • References
  • 13: Radical Interpretation and the Principle of Charity.
  • 1. What Is Radical Interpretation?
  • 2. The Role of Radical Interpretation for Meaning Theory
  • 3. The Principle of Charity
  • 4. The Power of Charity
  • 5. The Justification of Charity
  • References
  • 14: Davidson's Measurement-Theoretic Analogy
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Radical Interpretation and Indeterminacy
  • 3. The Inscrutability of Reference
  • 4. The General Case
  • 5. Instrumentalism or Realism?
  • References
  • 15: Reference
  • 1. Reference in T-Theories
  • 1.1. Fitting an infinite capacity in a finite head
  • 1.2. Conditions under which reference is required
  • 2. The Inscrutability of Reference
  • 2.1. Twisted T-theories
  • 2.2. The grain of the data
  • 2.3. Simplicity
  • 2.4. The formulation of inscrutability: relativizations
  • 3. Explanations and Reference
  • 3.1. Reference-invoking explanations
  • 3.2. Explanations involving beliefs about reference?
  • References
  • 16: Language and Thought
  • 1. Davidson's View and Two Others
  • 2. Davidson and the View that Thought Precedes Language
  • 3. Conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 17: Conceptual Schemes
  • References
  • 18: Interpretation and Value
  • Interpretation and Value
  • 1. The Interpretation Argument
  • 2. The Application to Desires and Normative Beliefs
  • 3. The Application to Values and Normative Truths
  • 4. The Triangulation Argument
  • References
  • 19: Predication
  • References
  • 20: Convention and Meaning
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The Public Nature of Meaning
  • 3. Semantics and Ulterior Purposes
  • 4. Word Meaning and Speaker Meaning
  • 5. Is There Such a Thing as a Language?
  • 6. Radically Interpreting Mrs. Malaprop
  • References
  • 21: Metaphor and Varieties of Meaning
  • Davidson on Metaphor
  • 1. "What Metaphors Mean"
  • 2. "A Nice Derangement of Metaphors"
  • 3. Evaluating a Hybrid Davidsonian View of Metaphor
  • Acknowledgment
  • References.
  • 22: Davidson and Literary Theory
  • Davidson and Literary Theory
  • 1. Locating Literary Language
  • 1.1. Intention and language
  • 1.2. The role of reference in "storytelling"
  • 1.3. Triangulation in literary interpretation
  • 2. Convention
  • 2.1 Metaphor and figuration
  • 3. Davidson's Influence on Literary Theory
  • 3.1. Intentionalism and anticonventionalism
  • 3.2. Metaphor
  • 4. Texts
  • 5. Sketch of a Davidsonian Account of Texts
  • References
  • Part IV: Philosophy of Mind
  • 23: The Larger Philosophical Significance of Holism
  • The Larger Philosophical Significance of Holism
  • 1. Holism and Charity Defended
  • 2. How to Formulate Relativism
  • 3. The Davidsonian Strategy Against Relativism
  • 4. Two Further Issues
  • 4.1. Incommensurability in science
  • 4.2. Reenvisioning Quine's metaphor of the web of belief
  • 24: Anomalous Monism
  • 1. Three Principles
  • 2. Event Individuation
  • 3. An Argument for Monism
  • 4. Strict Laws
  • 5. Anomalism
  • 6. Irreducibility
  • 7. Supervenience
  • 8. Mental Causation
  • References
  • 25: Triangular Externalism
  • 1. Outlines of Triangular Externalism
  • 2. Externalism, Interpretation, and Holism
  • 3. Davidson on Other Forms of Externalism
  • 4. Triangulation and the Determination of Thought Content
  • 5. Triangulation and the Objectivity of Thought
  • References
  • 26: Triangulation
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The Triangulation Argument
  • 2.1. Primitive triangulation
  • 2.2. Linguistic triangulation
  • 3. Objections to the Triangulation Argument
  • 3.1. Fixing meanings does not require triangulation
  • 3.2. Possessing the concept of objective truth does not require linguistic triangulation
  • 3.3. Possession of a language and thoughts does not require possession of the concept of objective truth
  • 3.4. The account of what makes language and thought possible is circular
  • 4. Conclusion
  • References.
  • 27: Rationality as a Constitutive Ideal
  • 1. Kant, Carnap, and Quine
  • 2. Davidsonian Interpretation Theory
  • 3. Charity as a Constraint on Interpretation
  • 4. Realism, Instrumentalism, and Eliminativism
  • 5. Cognitive Science and Radical Interpretation
  • 6. Representation and Rationality in Nonlinguistic Creatures
  • 7. Davidson's Contributions to the Study of Rationality
  • References
  • 28: Irrationality
  • References
  • 29: The Rationality of the Emotions
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Emotions and Cognition
  • 3. Emotions and their Causes
  • 4. Objections
  • 5. Privileged Access to Emotions
  • 6. Emotions and Irrationality
  • 7. Animal Affects
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Part V: Epistemology
  • 30: Davidson and Radical Skepticism
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Davidson on Radical Interpretation and the Principle of Charity
  • 3. Davidson's Route to Antiskepticism I: The Omniscient Interpreter
  • 4. Davidson's Route to Antiskepticism II: Triangulation and Content Externalism
  • 5. Contra Davidson's Transcendental Antiskepticism
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 31: First-Person Authority
  • 1. The Phenomenon of First-Person Authority
  • 1.1. Davidson's critique of other accounts of self-knowledge
  • 2. Davidson's Explanation of First-Person Authority
  • 2.1. The general strategy
  • 2.2. Knowledge of meaning: Disquotation
  • 2.3. Knowledge of meaning: The determination of meaning
  • 2.4. What Davidson's account does not explain
  • 2.5. Davidson's dissatisfaction with his account
  • 3. First-Person Authority and Semantic Externalism
  • References
  • 32: Knowledge of Other Minds in Davidson's Philosophy
  • 1. The Measure of All Things
  • 2. Understanding Others
  • References
  • Part VI: Influences and Influence
  • 33: Quine and Davidson
  • 1. Logical Pragmatism
  • 2. Naturalism
  • 3. Language, Meaning, and Use
  • 4. Truth.

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